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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
CURRICULUM, PEDAGOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF TEACHERS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS
I. INTRODUCTION
American schools have served as battlegrounds for competing so-
cial policies for generations. Major national disputes have centered
on racial problems, busing, and federal funding. Local debate con-
tinues over curricula, teacher competence, pedagogical methods,
textbooks and library books, discipline, and such trivial matters as
hairstyle. Nationally, the current debates about school prayer and
tax credits for the payment of private school tuition have con-
sumed the time and resources of numerous individuals.1 These dis-
putes show no sign of abating.
Elementary and secondary schools, most of which are publicly
supported, are essential institutions in the United States. They
provide each generation with the learning skills needed in a post-
industrial democracy, as well as the social skills necessary for soci-
ety to function smoothly. The daily operation and administration
of these schools is important not only to students, teachers, and
administrators, but to all of us. The explosion of laws, regulations,
and judicial orders affecting the operation of schools raises serious
questions about the desirability of greater legal interference be-
cause of the adversarial confrontations that often follow. The law's
intrusion into the operation of schools, nevertheless, has led to a
greater appreciation and understanding of the constitutional issues
affecting schools.
Teachers are the most significant participants in the educational
process. Their work involves those activities-speaking, writing,
and questioning-that constitute the core values protected by the
first amendment. The law, however, subjects teachers from the
kindergarten through the university levels to a variety of limita-
1. Stories about the attempted introduction of prayer in public schools have filled the
popular press. Recently, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute al-
lowing a state income tax deduction for tuition, transportation, and textbook expenses in-
curred in connection with the education of elementary and secondary schoolchildren. The
statute was challenged as a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment
because 95% of the private school students in Minnesota attended sectarian schools. Muel-
ler v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). The author previously addressed the issues raised by
such legislation. See Hunter, The Continuing Debate Over Tuition Tax Credits, 7 HAsTINGs
CONST. L. Q. 523 (1980).
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tions on both written and spoken expression. Statutes, ordinances,
regulations, and contract provisions affect classroom activity, aca-
demic research, publication decisions, hiring and firing within the
school, and sometimes, the scope of permissible behavior outside
the school itself.
Throughout the educational system, a constant tension exists be-
tween the constitutional value of unfettered speech and the social,
political, and academic goals of those who control the schools. The
educational system provides a fascinating opportunity to consider
competing and complementary values in a political system that
treats free expression as central to the pursuit of truth,2 while rec-
ognizing the social need for some limitations on individual speech
and inquiry.3 Reconciliation of the competing values depends upon
whether the educational system should provide a forum for free
speech and research, transmit acquired knowledge and train indi-
viduals for useful occupations, serve as social laboratories for pur-
suing identified social goals, or accomplish some combination of
these objectives.
The relative importance and difficulty of these questions vary
greatly among the different functional levels of educational institu-
tions. This Article focuses on the interplay between the constitu-
tional structures that protect identified individual rights4 and the
institutional mechanisms that have developed for educating Amer-
ican children through the secondary school level.5 Part II examines
2. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For
a rejection of Holmes's classic statement of the "marketplace of ideas", see Baker, Scope of
the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978).
3. The government may subject protected speech to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. See, e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). The
right of the press to publish a story, collect information, or conceal the identity of sources
must yield, in some circumstances, to a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial or the
state's interest in enforcing the criminal laws. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). But cf. Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
4. These rights include interests identified or identifiable through the political and judi-
cial processes. This Article focuses on issues of the positive law and does not attempt to
solve underlying normative problems involving theories of rights.
5. For an overview of the kinds of problems facing higher education, see GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (W. Hobbs ed. 1978); THE COURTS AND EDUCATION (C.
Hooker ed. 1978); W. KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1978); Hunter, The Consti-
tutional Status of Academic Freedom in the United States, 19 MINERVA - (1982);
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cases that establish the applicable standards of the positive law.
Part III reconciles inconsistent strands of the relevant case law,
offering a consistent approach for defining the Constitution's role
in the operation of our schools. The author concludes that some
conflicts between social goals and individual rights in the educa-
tional system cannot be reconciled. For reasons of policy and prac-
ticality, the political process should attempt to resolve these con-
flicts; but to ensure adequate protection for basic substantive
rights, clearly articulated institutional processes should exist that
permit proper consideration of those rights.
II. STATE CONTROL OF THE CONTENT AND PROCESS OF TEACHING
A. The Background
Academic freedom is important to teachers because it allows
them to influence curriculum content and pedagogical methods.
The German concept of Lehrfreiheit6 underlies the doctrine that
teachers should be responsible for the subject matter and teaching
methods used in their classes. Nevertheless, in the primary and
secondary schools a teacher often has only limited control over cur-
riculum structures and course content. He may have some discre-
tion, however, in the use of individual pedagogical methods.7 The
judicial decisions that seek to balance external controls and
teacher discretion suggest that the balance may raise first amend-
ment questions.8 The decisions have created little definitive law on
the subject; to the contrary, they have left a muddled field of con-
stitutional jurisprudence filled with vague notions about free
speech.
Several United States Supreme Court opinions and numerous
Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HAtv. L. REV.
879 (1979); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAtv. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
6. Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote the modern seminal work. W. VON HUMBOLDT, THE
SPHERE AND DtrIEs OF GOVERNMENT (London 1854). See also Nisbet, Max Weber and the
Roots of Academic Freedom, in CONTROVERSIES AND DECISIONS 103 (C. Frankel ed. 1976).
7. The state usually interferes less directly in university curricula, but the resolution of
competing interests may be more difficult at the post-secondary level. See generally Hunter,
Federal Antibias Legislation and Academic Freedom: Some Problems with Enforcement
Procedures, 27 EMoRY L.J. 609 (1978); O'Neil, God and Government at Yale: The Limits of
Federal Regulation of Higher Education, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 525 (1975).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 58-139.
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commentaries address the general subject of academic freedom,
but few focus specifically on the conflict between direct state regu-
lation of the curriculum and the expressed interests of individual
teachers. The two most significant decisions are Meyer v. Ne-
braska,9 a substantive due process opinion, and Epperson v. Ar-
kansas,10 the latter-day "monkey trial."
Meyer arose during the early twentieth century when some mid-
western states with large immigrant populations enacted statutes
limiting foreign language study. The ostensible state purposes were
to foster the integration of foreign ethnic groups into American life
and to avoid the development of a multi-lingual society.1 Mr.
Meyer taught German in a parochial school in Nebraska. He was
convicted for violating a Nebraska criminal statute that prohibited
instruction in the German language before the eighth grade.12 The
United States Supreme Court held that the Nebraska statute vio-
lated the Constitution, but did not base its decision on the first
amendment.13 Rather, Meyer followed a line of substantive due
process decisions announced by the Court during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. 4
Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, identified three
constitutional flaws in the Nebraska statute: the statute limited
Meyer's freedom to pursue a lawful calling;15 it restricted the op-
9. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
10. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
11. 262 U.S. at 397-98.
12. 1919 Neb. Laws 249. The Court invalidated a similar Iowa statute in a companion
case, Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
13. Indeed,.the Court had not yet applied the first amendment to the states. The incorpo-
ration of first amendment rights into those protected by the fourteenth amendment came a
few years later in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), and Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927).
14. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTuroNAL
LAW §§ 8-1 to 8-7, at 427-55 (1978).
15. 262 U.S. at 401. Justice McReynold's language suggests that Meyer had a property
interest in his profession. More recent Court decisions support this notion, holding that the
Constitution entitles professors at public institutions to some minimal due process before
discharge. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S.
207 (1971). But see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (a non-tenured teacher
has no property or liberty interest in his job); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.)
(notice and hearing not required before dismissal of a non-tenured professor), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
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portunities for students below a certain age to acquire knowledge; 6
and it restrained the ability of parents to exercise control over
their families by contracting with instructors for the children's ed-
ucation.17 The Court in Meyer thus based its decision on the prop-
erty interest in pursuing a profession, the freedom to contract, the
right to acquire information, and the parental interest in control-
ling the family unit. In one passage, Justice McReynolds defined
the Court's underlying concept of liberty as including
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occu-
pations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those priv-
ileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."s
The Court did not indicate whether the statute would have been
constitutional if limited to public schools, nor how to resolve prop-
erly a dispute among parents, teachers, and school authorities con-
cerning the inclusion or exclusion of subject matter. The Court rec-
ognized, however, that the state could pay for public schools,
require school attendance, 9 and exert some control over the curric-
16. 262 U.S. at 401. The Court implied that children had an undefined constitutional
right to receive or acquire information. Id. The Court's approach to children's rights has
been somewhat uneven. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See generally Burt, Developing Constitutional
Rights In, Of and For Children, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 118 (1975); Developments in
the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Developments]. For a discussion of the right to receive information, see Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and
infra text accompanying notes 140-254.
17. 262 U.S. at 401. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (first amendment
free exercise clause gives Amish parents the right to keep their children out of public school
after the eighth grade). But cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (aunt of a nine-
year-old child convicted for violating state child labor laws by sending her niece into the
streets to sell religious magazines, even though child did so enthusiastically); Davis v. Page,
385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974) (parents' religious belief that audio-visual equipment was
"sinful" could not be imposed on their children in public schools, even though use of the
equipment interfered with the children's "free exercise" of religion).
18. 262 U.S. at 399.
19. A state may require attendance at private or public schools. See Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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ulum. 20 Thus, Meyer's status as a private school teacher may have
been crucial to the decision.21
For years Meyer received little attention. Courts occasionally
placed it in the "family rights" area, along with Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.22 In Pierce, the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an
Oregon law that effectively eliminated private schools, creating a
state monopoly in elementary and secondary education.
Forty-five years after Meyer, the Court in Epperson v. Arkan-
sas23 heard a challenge to another statute that imposed criminal
sanctions for teaching a particular subject. An Arkansas law pro-
hibited any teacher in a public school or state university from
teaching or using any textbook suggesting that "mankind ascended
or descended from a lower order of animals. '24 The challenge
raised issues considerably different from those in Meyer. The pro-
hibition only affected public institutions, leaving private school
and university teachers unaffected. The prohibition also only af-
fected a portion of a scientific subject area: biology teachers could
teach anything except evolution. Finally, the state had not en-
forced the statute for forty years. Teachers in public institutions
had taught evolutionary theory, and state prosecutors had shown
little inclination to enforce the law.25 If a teacher had not brought
a declaratory judgment action to challenge the statute, it likely
would have been left to desuetude.26
The teacher in Epperson argued that the law had an impermissi-
20. 262 U.S. at 402.
21. See Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to De-
termine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1308-09 (1976).
22. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court reasoned in Pierce that an Oregon law interfered un-
reasonably with parental control over child rearing. See generally Developments, supra note
16.
23. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
24. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628. Cf. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363
(1927) (upholding the constitutionality of Tennessee's infamous "monkey law").
25. 393 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1968). "[T]he pallid, unenthusiastic, even apologetic defense of
the Act presented by the State in this Court indicates that the State would make no at-
tempt to enforce the law should it remain on the books for the next century." Id. at 109-110
(Black, J., concurring).
26. The recent popularity of "scientific creationism" has made the old statute seem less of
an anachronism. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(holding unconstitutional a recent Arkansas statute that required the teaching of "creation-
ism," a modified version of the Genesis creation story).
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ble chilling effect on speech and violated due process because the
statute was vague and ambiguous.27 She also argued that the stat-
ute amounted to an unconstitutional establishment of religion be-
cause, by negative implication, it made Genesis a publicly sup-
ported version of the truth.2 8 The majority rejected the free speech
and due process arguments, but agreed that the statute violated
the establishment clause.2 9 Justice Fortas, writing for the Court,
said:
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body
of knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the
sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular reli-
gious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group."0
Epperson thus became another brick in the constitutional wall be-
tween public education and the advocacy of religious doctrine.$1
Justices Black and Stewart filed concurring opinions in Epper-
son.n Justice Black's concurrence legitimately criticized the major-
ity's opinion and raised many difficult questions. He rejected the
establishment clause analysis, finding instead that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.33 Unlike Justice Stewart, he did not be-
lieve that the central issue was the teacher's right to speak. 4 Black
reasoned that the state had broad discretion to exercise curriculum
control in public schools. The state could remove entire subjects
from the curriculum if the materials were too controversial or emo-
27. 393 U.S. at 102.
28. Id. at 103.
29. Id. By focusing on the establishment of religion question, the Court avoided the prob-
lem of defining speech in the teaching context.
30. Id. at 103 (footnote omitted).
31. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962). Several commentators have addressed the general problem of state involvement with
religious education. See generally Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools, 56 CALin. L. Rv. 260 (1968); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L.
Rav. 1680 (1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment, 80 HAnv. L. Rv. 1381 (1967); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513
(1968).
32. 393 U.S. at 109 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 115 (Stewart, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 112-13 (Black, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice Stewart's opinion, see
infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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tionally charged for young minds. In such instances, he reasoned,
the state simply left responsibility for instruction to the parents. A
state's curriculum exclusion would implicate constitutional issues
only if the exclusion had a pernicious effect on other clearly pro-
tected rights or interests. 3 5
Justice Black and the majority had fundamentally different un-
derstandings of the Arkansas Supreme Court decision upholding
the statute." The majority interpreted the statute to mean that
the biblical story of creation was official state dogma.37 This read-
ing obviously facilitated application of the establishment clause ra-
tionale. Black, on the other hand, thought that the statute and the
Arkansas Supreme Court decision prohibited the teaching of both
Genesis and the theories of Darwin; the state had excluded en-
tirely a controversial topic from the curriculum. 8
The legislature may have acted unwisely by eliminating the
teaching of evolution but, in Black's view, the state did not act
unconstitutionally. The remedy for unwise choices lays in the po-
litical process, rather than the judicial arena. Turning such choice-
making into a constitutional issue would restrict unnecessarily po-
litical freedom of action. According to Black, the Arkansas legisla-
ture violated the Constitution by drafting a statute that was so
ambiguous that it offended due process-not by choosing to dic-
tate a portion of the curriculum.
Justice Black also disagreed further with Justice Stewart's argu-
ment that the Court should focus on the rights of the individual
teacher. Black maintained that a teacher in a state-supported
school does not have a right to control the curriculum and the ped-
agogical method. Rather, states may regulate both the method and
the content of teaching." Justice Black did not elaborate on this
observation which appears to support unfettered state bureaucratic
control of curriculum content and teaching methodology. His reli-
ance on due process as a basis for the concurrence indicates, how-
ever, that state regulation could not be arbitrary or capricious.
35. Id. at 112 (Black, J., concurring).
36. 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967) (per curiam) (upholding statute as an exercise of
police power without reaching basic constitutional issues).
37. 393 U.S. at 103.
38. Id. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring).
39. Id.
19831
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Justice Stewart's concurring opinion was enigmatic, yet it con-
tained an important doctrinal seed. He declared that a state may.
exclude a subject from the curriculum, but may not punish a
teacher who makes students aware of knowledge that is not in the
prescribed curriculum.
It is one thing for a State to determine that the "subject of
higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology" shall or shall not
be included in its public school curriculum. It is quite another
thing for a State to make it a criminal offense for a public school
teacher so much as to mention the very existence of an entire
system of respected human thought. That kind of criminal law, I
think, would clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free com-
munication contained in the First Amendment, and made appli-
cable to the states by the Fourteenth.40
Under Justice Stewart's view, if Arkansas law required all high
school students to take a course in biology, including an introduc-
tion to Darwin's theory of evolution, then a biology teacher who
discussed the biblical theory of creation also would receive first
amendment protection. Genesis represents a respected part of our
cultural and religious heritage. A study of Genesis assists in the
appreciation of human nature and suggests, albeit indirectly, that
limitations exist on knowledge acquired through the scientific
method. Yet, the majority's opinion provided a basis that would
justify taking action against the biology teacher: discussion of Gen-
esis in a context other than a secular class on religion may give rise
to the concerns with "establishment of religion" that underlay the
41majority opinion.
Justice Stewart did not define what he meant by a "system of
respected human thought, '42 nor did he explain why a state could
strike a subject from the curriculum altogether, but could not dis-
cipline a teacher for discussing the subject. He might have been
40. Id. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
41. Some scholars have expressed concern that the Court may have gone so far in de-
manding religious neutrality that the state now must be antireligious; Arguably, the applica-
tion of the establishment clause may conflict with the free exercise clause. See generally
Greenawalt, Whalen, Riles, Sugarman & Karsh, Education in a Democracy: Financial Sup-
port of Private, Public and Parochial Schools, 3 Hum. RTs. 17 (1973); Costanzo, Wholesome
Neutrality: Law and Education, 43 N.D.L. REv. 605 (1967).
42. 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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considering occasional comments outside the prescribed curricu-
lum that could merit protection as casual, extraneous speech.4"
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart looked at the problem in Epper-
son from a fundamentally different perspective from the major-
ity's-a viewpoint critical to an appreciation of later cases. The
central figure in Stewart's opinion was the teacher; his primary
concern was with limitations on a teacher's speech within the class-
room. Stewart conceded that states have general power over school
curricula. He did not believe, however, that a state could use this
general authority to restrict unduly a teacher's methods of instruc-
tion, including the teacher's decision to discuss related areas not
specifically included in the curriculum. Justice Stewart did not
propose that the Constitution entitles teachers to control school
curricula. He simply maintained that a teacher does not abdicate
all individual rights of free speech when he enters the classroom,
provided that the exercise of those rights does not interfere with
the performance of his professional duties. In his view, Epperson
was a free speech case, not an establishment case.
Justice Stewart addressed a potentially significant problem that
the rest of the Court ignored. A subject area that the state excised
from the curriculum could be critical to a sound understanding of
the entire subject matter. A teacher compelled to present a funda-
mentally untrue picture of the subject area might feel profession-
ally derelict. The issue then becomes whether a state may constitu-
tionally require a teacher to teach something other than, or
perhaps less than, the truth. The Supreme Court has held that a
state cannot compel a newspaper to publish an article,"" or compel
a private citizen to display a motto on his automobile license plate
when he disagrees with the sentiment expressed.45 These two cases
support the proposition that the right of free speech includes the
right to be silent. Thus, a teacher might argue that he has a consti-
tutional basis for refusing to teach an untruth or partial truth.6
43. For a discussion of extracurricular speech, see Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968).
44. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
45. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
46. Whether the right to be silent or to speak affects the state's power to regulate an
employee's speech in the performance of his job is an issue considered later in this Article.
See infra text accompanying notes 297-324.
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Three additional cases add texture to the background of the cur-
riculum-control issue. In West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,47 the Supreme Court ruled that a state could not com-
pel a child to salute the flag in a public school in violation of his
religious beliefs. Barnette is, in one sense, the other half of Epper-
son. The state may not compel a student to act against his reli-
gious beliefs, nor may the state compel the teaching of an inher-
ently religious doctrine, as in Epperson.4s The state law at issue in
Barnette violated the free exercise clause, however, not the estab-
lishment clause.
A few months after Epperson, the Court held in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District4 that the first
amendment protected children who wore black armbands to school
to protest the Vietnam war. The Court said that both teachers and
students possessed first amendment rights on school campuses, 50
and suggested that the first amendment protected speech as well
as religious interests, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
47. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d
Cir. 1972) (school teacher excused from patriotic activities because of religious convictions),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973). In Barnette, the Court overruled Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), a case involving virtually identical facts. For an interesting
discussion of the Court's remarkable reversal, see Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in
Felix Frankfurter's First Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 257.
48. An interesting problem arises when racial inequality is a basic religious tenet. See
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976); Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556
F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Note, Racial Exclu-
sion by Religious Schools, 91 HARv. L. REv. 879 (1978); Note, Racial Discrimination in
Private Schools, Section 1981, and the Free Exercise of Religion: The Sectarian Loophole
of Runyon v. McCrary, 48 U. COLO. L. RE V. 419 (1977). Some courts have imposed limits on
the extent to which a state must accommodate religious beliefs. See Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Palmer v.
Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980). Cf. Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 421 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the dissent maintained that
Sherbert effectively overruled Braunfeld). The Supreme Court recently upheld an Internal
Revenue Service denial of tax-exempt status to two educational institutions that practice
racial discrimination. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
49. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
50. Id. at 506. The Court did not limit to a specific location the students' right to wear
armbands. Implicitly then, the students' right extended to all areas of the campus.
In an interesting passage, Justice Fortas said: "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50
years." Id. He cited Meyer for support. Meyer was not a first amendment case though, a
point noted by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 519-21 (Black, J., dissenting).
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restrictions.5 1 The decision demonstrated that school authorities
could not abridge campus speech activities without raising funda-
mental constitutional issues.
Two years after Tinker, the Court ruled in Wisconsin v. Yoder5'
that Amish children need not attend school beyond the age
deemed appropriate by their religious sect, despite a state law re-
quiring attendance beyond that age. The Court in Yoder recog-
nized that even basic, widely accepted educational policy decisions
may have to yield to constitutional concerns. Yoder thus provides
a framework for constitutional limitation of state authority in the
educational field. The Court acknowledged the power of states to
enact compulsory attendance laws, set accreditation standards, and
establish the general curriculum.53 At the same time, the Court
recognized a legitimate interest in parental control over the chil-
dren's education that might differ fundamentally from the
majoritarian sentiment expressed by the state legislature.5
The Court's treatment of the family as an institution has been
ambiguous.55 In Yoder, however, the Court expressed concern for
the value of the family institution, notwithstanding the value of an
education acquired through prescribed methods. One commentator
has suggested that Yoder reflects a societal consensus on the value
of education, but a societal uncertainty about the most desirable
means of providing it.
[1]n Yoder the Court was faced by an ambiguous condition in
the mores, both at the level of popular belief and at the level of
sophisticated and conscientious reflection. The opinion is wide-
spread in our society that children should be educated at least
until the age of 16. But disagreements as to what is a proper and
51. Id. at 508-09. Tinker was not an easily achieved victory for the students. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the complaint. 258 F.
Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
heard the case en banc but divided evenly, thus affirming the district court's decision. 383
F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967). In the Supreme Court, Justices Black and Harlan dissented, and
Justices Stewart and White concurred on grounds narrower than those relied upon by the
majority. 393 U.S. at 514 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 515 (White, J., concurring); id.
(Black, J., dissenting); id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. Id. at 213.
54. Id. at 214.
55. See Developments, supra note 16.
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effective education-whether it should be in the classroom or
outside, whether it should be academic for all or vocational or
highly individualized, or religious or secular, or "cognitive" or
"affective"-are rife both in the teaching profession and the
community at large. In these circumstances, the Amish provide
simply one more system of education, and one worth permitting
if for no other reason than its useful demonstration purposes."
Meyer, Epperson, and Tinker demonstrate that the Constitution
can play a significant role in the resolution of problems within
schools and in the allocation of educational responsibilities. Yoder
put the entire educational process in a broad social context con-
taining a host of values that at times may conflict with one an-
other. Yoder suggests that the assertion of a fundamental value by
one interest group may conflict with a fundamental value of an-
other group. Nevertheless, a court should exercise discretion in
raising issues to constitutional proportions because freedom of ac-
tion becomes circumscribed once an interest becomes a constitu-
tional right.57
B. The Search for Guidelines in the Lower Courts
Several cases have involved conflicts between teachers and
school administrators over course content and pedagogical meth-
ods. These cases have involved fairly particularized problems, and
56. Frankel, The Jurisprudence of Liberty, 46 Miss. L.J. 561, 620 (1975). Professor Kur-
land believed that Yoder conflicted with Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), in
which the Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who had sent her nine-year-
old niece into the street to sell religious tracts. The Massachusetts child labor laws out-
weighed family preservation and parental authority. See Kurland, The Supreme Court,
Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religious Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv.
213, 240-41 (1973). Professor Frankel believed that "[t]he Court in Prince acted on what is
now the almost universally accepted moral principle that child labor is prima facie suspect,
and that state intervention even against parents is justified when child labor is involved." 46
Miss. L.J. at 620.
57. This suggestion does not mean that freedom of action by governing authorities is an
unqualified good. Eighteen years ago, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland easily affirmed the nonrenewal of a teacher's contract because she had assigned
Aldous Huxley's BRAVE NE W WORLD. Parker v. Board of Educ. 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.),
aff'd per curiam, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). As a
general rule, school authorities have a legitimate interest in reading assignments. Perhaps
the Court's refusal to constitutionalize the teacher's discretion to make reading assignments
was wise, but the punishment does appear to have been draconian.
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do not fit easily into a comprehensive pattern. To the extent that
they offer any guidance, one can conclude that some right exists
for teachers, and sometimes students, to make choices about cur-
riculum content and teaching methods. Courts usually define and
justify this right by reference to communal interests rather than
individual ones.
Two cases often cited for the proposition that secondary school
teachers have a constitutional right to select pedagogical methods
are Keefe v. Geanakos58 and Parducci v. Rutland.59 Both cases in-
dicate how deeply the adversarial process has penetrated the pub-
lic schools.
Keefe involved a high school English teacher in Ipswich, Massa-
chusetts who assigned his senior students an article from the At-
lantic Monthly. The article concerned the nature of dissent and
contained a strong expletive. The teacher, fearing that the article
might offend some students, provided an alternative assignment.
Some parents complained nonetheless, and their complaints re-
sulted in disciplinary action against the teacher, who then filed
suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit de-
cided that the article was not obscene,60 found that other books in
the school library contained the word,61 and concluded that high
school seniors were bright enough to read their assignments dis-
criminately.6 2 The court, without making a principled analysis,
adopted a reasonableness standard and substituted its decision for
that of the school administrators. The court did not state why the
teacher or the court were more qualified to decide than the school
authorities. 8
In Parducci, school administrators fired an eleventh-grade
58. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
59. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
60. A straightforward obscenity analysis could lead one astray because different standards
apply to minors. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). If something is obscene,
however, that should be prima facie evidence of its unsuitability for classroom instruction.
61. The appearance of a particular word in a library book, however, does not make that
word an appropriate topic for classroom discussion.
62. 418 F.2d at 361-62.
63. The court also skirted the issue of insubordination. The teacher had said that he
would not refrain from further use of the word. 418 F.2d at 361. Similarly, in Parducci, the
teacher said that she would make assignments in her own discretion, regardless of the
wishes of her superiors. 316 F. Supp. at 354. See Goldstein, supra note 21, at 1331 n.123.
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teacher who had assigned a Kurt Vonnegut story. The school ad-
ministrators admittedly had not read the story before firing the
teacher. 4 The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama said that the notion that "teachers are entitled to First
Amendment freedoms is an issue no longer in dispute."6 5 This was
a novel statement for the court to make in the context of this case
because no court had suggested previously that teachers have a
first amendment right to make their own decisions about high
school reading materialg, free from administrative control. Surpris-
ingly, the court relied on Tinker, a case that had nothing directly
to do with curriculum content or pedagogy. Tinker involved the
use of public schools as forums for individual political expression
by students. The court in Parducci did not say that teachers are
free from all controls over curriculum and pedagogy, but placed
the burden on the school authorities to prove that the limitations
on a teacher's constitutional interest in determining course content
were reasonable. The court decided that the Vonnegut story would
not disrupt the classroom and was within the scope of reasonable
instruction for an eleventh-grade English class.6
In both Keefe and Parducci, federal judges reviewed decisiofis
by local school authorities concerning the proper content of high
school curricula. Both courts raised the disputes to constitutional
levels. The Atlantic Monthly article may have had literary value,
but it is reasonable for school authorities to raise legitimate con-
cerns about the assignment of materials that contain vulgar lan-
guage. A teacher is an authority figure who has a captive audience
with relatively immature minds. Although one may look askance at
a school principal who characterizes a Vonnegut story as "literary
garbage" without having read the story, this does not mean that
the Constitution should protect a teacher's choice of reading as-
signments. The courts in Keefe and Parducci cast fairly routine
internal disputes in constitutional terms, and actually read the
materials in order to make substantive value judgments. Both deci-
sions encourage an adversarial relationship between teachers and
64. The principal and the associate superintendent characterized the work as "literary
garbage" that condoned free sex and the killing of old people. 316 F. Supp. at 353-54.
65. Id. at 354.
66. Id. at 356-57.
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administrators, and substitute judges as arbiters of homework as-
signments. They fail, however, to offer a principled basis for the
constitutional protection afforded the two teachers.
In a much more thorough opinion, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts considered many of the
same issues. Mailloux v. Kiley6 7 involved an eleventh-grade En-
glish instructor who wrote an offensive word on the blackboard
during a discussion of social conventions and taboos. He asked for
a volunteer to define the word in polite language; one student did
so, and a brief discussion followed. The school committee charged
the instructor with "conduct unbecoming a teacher" 8 and subse-
quently discharged him. He sued for reinstatement.e
Mailloux argued that he had a substantive constitutional right to
choose a teaching method that served a demonstrated educational
purpose. He also asserted a procedural right not to be discharged
for using a method not proscribed by regulation or other prior no-
tice. Although the court did not adopt Mailloux's arguments com-
pletely, the court specifically recognized the teacher's qualified
constitutional right to determine his own teaching method, so long
as it is "relevant" and "has a serious educational purpose. ' 7° The
court placed the burden of proof on the teacher who uses an unor-
thodox method to show that the method "has the support of the
preponderant opinion of the teaching profession or of the part of it
to which he belongs. '71 In the absence of such a showing, a school
board could discipline a teacher, despite the teacher's good faith
use of a relevant method described by experts as serving "a serious
educational purpose. ' '72
Compared with Parducci, the Mailloux decision exhibits much
more deference to local control. Under Mailloux, the Constitution
67. 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), afl'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
68. 323 F. Supp. at 1389.
69. After the school board dismissed Mailloux, he sought injunctive relief. Citing Keefe v.
Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit granted a preliminary injunction. The defendants immediately appealed, and asked
the court to stay the order pending the appeal. The First Circuit denied the motion for a
stay and dismissed the appeal, sending the case back for a trial on the merits. 436 F.2d 565
(lst Cir. 1971).
70. 323 F. Supp. at 1391.
71. Id. at 1392.
72. Id.
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protects a teacher's unorthodox method. If school administrators
object, however, the teacher must prove that his methods are peda-
gogically sound. Although Mailloux limits the "freedom to teach,"
it also provides a constitutional basis for challenging disciplinary
action that results from the use of a particular method of instruc-
tion. But the approach in Mailloux still requires a careful eviden-
tiary review that may be time-consuming and detrimental to the
educational process. 3
The decision in Mailloux did not accord a high school teacher
much flexibility in selecting a pedagogical method. 4 But to assure
adequate protection for the limited liberty that the court did de-
fine, the court carefully included an element of due process. To
justify disciplinary action under Mailloux, the school board must
prove that the teacher had prior notice-by regulation, contract, or
otherwise-that the school board had proscribed the challenged
teaching method. According to the court, the Constitution entitles
a teacher to fair notice and due process, not by reason of state
employment or "because he is a citizen,"7 but because in his teach-
ing capacity he is engaged in the exercise of what may plausibly be
considered 'vital First Amendment rights.' 'p76 Toward the end of
the Mailloux opinion, the court stated its ultimate justification for
recognizing a limited first amendment right:
In his teaching capacity he is not required to "guess what con-
duct or utterance may lose him his position ... " If he did not
73. See infra notes 331-40 and accompanying text.
74. The court distinguished between the high school and university levels, stating that
society should accord university teachers greater individual freedom than secondary school
teachers in course development. In distinguishing the two systems, the court noted a variety
of differences: high schools operate in loco parentis and are governed by locally chosen
school boards; secondary school teachers, as a group, do not have the tradition of indepen-
dence, broad discretion concerning teaching methods, or intellectual qualifications of post-
secondary instructors; many high school teachers have limited experience; society views high
school teachers primarily as transmitters of knowledge; society expects high school teachers
to indoctrinate students with prevailing value systems; and high school students are a cap-
tive audience. 323 F. Supp. at 1392.
75. The phrase "because he is a citizen" may cause confusion. A teacher's employment
does not alter his rights as a citizen. The issue is whether his rights as a citizen are mani-
fested in his professional occupation and, therefore, entitled to legal protection.
76. 323 F. Supp. at 1392 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604
(1967)). Teaching includes "vital First Amendment rights" not because it involves speech,
but because it is an instrument of the democratic process.
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have the right to be warned before he was discharged, he might
be more timid than it is in the public interest that he should
be, and he might steer away from reasonable methods with
which it is in the public interest to experiment.7
The court found that Mailloux had not received adequate notice.
Therefore, the school committee had discharged him improperly.
As in Keefe and Parducci, the court in Mailloux based the right
of a high school teacher to teach according to his conscience on the
free speech clause of the first amendment. In the court's analysis,
teaching is an exercise of the right of expression and not, as in
Meyer, a property right."8 Mailloux challenged the school board
because the state, acting through the board, punished him for an
act of expression without prior warning of possible disciplinary ac-
tion. Mailloux's due process claim derived from the state's in-
fringement of his free speech rights, not from a notion that the
state had infringed a property interest in his profession. Thus, the
approach in Mailloux avoids the problem of "entitlements" and of
defining the scope of a property interest in public employment.79
The court thus defined the teacher's limited right not by reference
to the individual's- interest in expression, but in terms of the pub-
77. Id. (emphasis added). The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas employed this rationale to support a decision favoring a teacher who had been dis-
charged by a school board for adding teaching materials on race relations to those approved
for his course, and for stating that he personally did not oppose interracial marriage. Sterz-
ing v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated and re-
manded on remedial grounds, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974). The trial court said:
The Court finds these rights to be evident, the substantive rights of a teacher
to choose a teaching method, which ... served a demonstrated educational
purpose, and the procedural right of a teacher not to be discharged for the use
of a teaching method which was not proscribed by a regulation or definitive
administrative action, and as to which it was not proven that he had notice
that its use was prohibited.
376 F. Supp. at 662 (citing Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd per
curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971)). The court's principal point in Sterzing was that the
school board punished the teacher not for incompetence, insubordination, or proselytizing,
but for making a casual statement of personal views. Arguably, a forthright statement of
such views might be helpful in determining possible biases in the presentation of teaching
materials.
78. See supra note 15.
79. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). See generally Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Be-
tween Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861 (1982).
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lic's interest in creative teaching. Consequently, a teacher can only
be as experimental as the public interest demands, regardless of
whether he feels personally constrained by school regulations. The
court, by using the nebulous concept of the "public interest,"
turned an individual right into a collective one.
Secondary schools transmit information and inculcate values.
The schools are locally oriented and should be sensitive to local
concerns. Therefore, society must define individual teacher creativ-
ity by reference to the particular community interests. Administra-
tors, on the other hand, act unreasonably if they thwart the com-
munity's interest in encouraging creative teaching. Thus, in the
court's analysis, competing and complementary community inter-
ests may subsume the question of teachers' rights. Mailloux serves
as a paradigm for the continuing American dialectic on rights, how
they are defined, and what justifies state intrusion for purposes of
limiting or protecting them. A high school teacher may have a
right to speak, but so long as he speaks as a high school teacher,
community interests may limit his right. Community interests di-
minish in importance, however, as the teacher moves outside the
classroom.
The district court's approach in Mailloux sensitively addressed
the interrelationships of interests in the public schools. A similar
result was reached in Ahern v. Board of Education"0 through the
use of ordinary contract theory. A high school economics teacher
attended a workshop in educational theory and returned to her
school determined to employ "democratic" teaching methods. She
allowed her students to participate in the selection of course
materials and topics for class discussion. Current political issues
were a favorite topic, but they provoked disorder in the classroom.
School administrators admonished the teacher to teach economics
and to restore classroom control. The teacher disagreed with the
administrators and allowed her students to organize protests.
Shortly thereafter, the school board discharged the teacher for
insubordination."1
In a suit for reinstatement, the teacher alleged that her dismissal
violated her constitutional right to academic freedom. On appeal,
80. 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972).
81. Id. at 401-02.
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
disagreed:
Simply stated, our conclusion is that Miss Ahern was invested
by the Constitution with no right either (1) to persist in a course
of teaching behavior which contravened the valid dictates of her
employers, the public school board, regarding classroom method,
or (2), as phrased by the district court, "to teach politics in a
course in economics. 8 2
Despite allegations of constitutional infringement, the decision
in Ahern essentially rested on contract law. Ahern presumably un-
derstood the generally accepted standards of decorum and meth-
ods of instruction within the school district. The workshop she at-
tended prompted her to change previously acceptable teaching
methods. She could have followed procedures within the school
system to achieve changes in the prevailing teaching methods, at
least on an experimental basis.83 Instead, she unilaterally changed
her teaching format without consulting her superiors.
The substantive content of Ahern's dispute lay in contract the-
ory. A course in economics cannot ignore political reality, but eco-
nomics is not political science, history, civics, or current events.
Whatever rights the teacher may have had, once she signed a con-
tract to teach economics, the contract restricted her freedom under
the Constitution to teach other subjects. Similarly, requiring a
teacher to maintain reasonable classroom decorum is a matter of
contract law and professionalism."'
Mailloux also could have followed a contract analysis because
Mailloux might have breached his contract by using the offensive
word in the classroom. His action may have comported, however,
with acceptable practices, expectations, or previous interpretations
of school regulations. Even if a breach had occurred, it may not
have been substantial enough to justify repudiation of the con-
tract. Arguably, the school authorities were attempting a unilateral
82. Id. at 403-04 (quoting the lower court opinion, 327 F. Supp. 1391, 1397 (D. Neb.
1971)).
83. Perhaps such efforts would be futile. All that appears from the record is that Ahern
did not seek modification of the approved pedagogy.
84. Even in Tinker, the Supreme Court recognized a legitimate state interest in maintain-
ing classroom discipline. 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
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modification of the contract, and may have failed to act in good
faith. Thus, even under a contract analysis, the result in Mailloux
may not have changed.
A contract analysis is consistent with the general judicial dispo-
sition of avoiding constitutional questions whenever possible.85 A
consequence of Keefe, Parducci, and Mailloux may be a funda-
mental alteration in the relationship between teachers and school
authorities because the teacher's first amendment rights become a
matter of paramount concern. A court could view virtually any
classroom methodology related to the subject area as an exercise of
first amendment rights, and thus require that any regulations meet
constitutional standards rather than less onerous principles of con-
tract interpretation. Nothing in the Mailloux analysis prevents ap-
plication of contract theory to regulations adopted before a dis-
puted act, however, if a teacher challenges the regulations as
unconstitutionally restrictive.
Courts have rejected the argument that teachers have an ab-
solute first amendment right to determine curricula and appropri-
ate teaching methods. For instance, in Mercer v. Michigan State
Board of Education,8 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan upheld the constitutionality of a
Michigan statute that prohibited instruction in methods of contra-
ception, and that allowed parents to have their children excluded
from sex education classes. Several teachers had challenged the
85. Federal courts traditionally avoid broad constitutional decisions if a narrower, satis-
factory alternative basis for a decision exists. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331
U.S. 549 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). In the words of Justice Frank-
furter, "the most fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face consti-
tutional questions but to avoid them, if at all possible." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 320 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Federal courts also defer to state courts if a
state law remedy is available. See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941). Of course, the federal district court in Mailloux would not have had juris-
diction over a contract dispute.
86. 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) (mem.). See also Clark v.
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Simard v. Board of
Educ., 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973); Drawn v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106 (1st
Cir. 1971); Fluher v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971); Goldwasser
v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Knarr v. Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp.
832 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971).
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statute by relying upon Epperson and Meyer.87 The court said that
Epperson was inapposite because it involved the establishment
clause, and that Meyer was distinguishable as a substantive due
process case concerned with unreasonable restrictions on the pur-
suit of a legal calling.8 The district court declared that
"[t]he State may establish its curriculum either by law or by
delegation of its authority to the local school boards and com-
munities .... There is nothing in the First Amendment that
gives a person employed to teach *the Constitutional right to
teach beyond the scope of the established curriculum. 9
The solution in Mercer is not without its own difficulties. For
example, a biology teacher who must present students with the sci-
entific facts concerning birth control methods should endeavor to
be purely factual so that the instruction is scientific and informa-
tive while not directly or indirectly encouraging sexual permissive-
ness. That is a difficult task, and even the most limited discussion
might offend the religious beliefs of a teacher whose religion de-
nominates as immoral any discussion of birth control. Alterna-
tively, strict limitations on the scope of instruction might interfere
with the personal beliefs of a teacher who believes birth control
should be encouraged, especially among adolescents who might be
inclined to experiment regardless of the instruction they receive in
school. The sweeping language of Mercer precludes consideration
of either teacher's belief.
Although a substantive due process analysis had re-emerged by
1974,90 judicial reluctance to apply the rationale of Lochner and its
progeny continued. Thus, the court in Mercer had some difficulty
reconciling Meyer, but should not have called Meyer inapposite. In
Meyer, the Nebraska statute did not prohibit the teaching of Ger-
man; it only limited the age of children who could study the sub-
ject. In Mercer, the Michigan statute did not prohibit biology
teachers from plying their trade; it only prevented them from tell-
ing a portion of the story. The Michigan statute applied only to
87. 379 F. Supp. at 585.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973).
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the public sector, providing a sound basis for distinguishing Meyer,
but the statute did not provide a reason for finding Meyer
irrelevant.
The Court's decision in Meyer allowed some limitation on the
pursuit of a lawful calling, provided that the limitation has a ra-
tional basis. The district court in Mercer avoided the Lochner ap-
proach to constitutional decisionmaking, e1 but failed to address the
student-rights and parental-control arguments found in Meyer. 2
Mercer does not indicate whether the prohibition against birth
control instruction infringed upon the opportunity of students to
acquire information. The district court could not anticipate the
Supreme Court's uncertain efforts over the next few years to de-
velop a first amendment right to receive information,"3 but Meyer
at least had suggested the issue. The Michigan statute in Mercer
also may have interfered with the parents' interest in their chil-
dren's education. On balance, however, the statute probably inter-
fered no more than other curricular decisions. Nevertheless, Meyer
compelled at least cursory consideration of the issue.
The decision in Mercer is consistent with Holmes's dissent in
Meyer" and Black's concurrence in Epperson.5 The state, for rea-
sons not patently arbitrary, chose to exclude a subject from the
curriculum. States make these decisions all the time. One hardly
can envisage federal judges constantly reviewing school curricula
for pedagogical soundness. 9 Under Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Epperson,7 however, a discussion of birth control might
involve a body of respected thought and thereby merit some con-
stitutional protection. The teacher could lose the protection if the
91. The court did not characterize Meyer as a first amendment case, as Justice Fortas had
done in Tinker. 393 U.S. 503, 506.
92. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. The student-rights and parental-con-
trol prongs of Meyer could lead to inconsistent results. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), illustrate the conflicts that some-
times arise among parents, their children, and the state.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 140-254.
94. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting in both Bartels and
Meyer).
95. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
96. Ironically, the courts did review such matters in Keefe, Parducci, and Mailloux. See
supra text accompanying notes 60-63 & 70-73.
97. 393 U.S. 97, 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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discussion were to degenerate into proselytizing. The Keefe,
Parducci, and Mailloux opinions suggest that prima facie constitu-
tional protection exists for a discussion of birth control in the
classroom, and are logically related to Stewart's approach in Ep-
person. Application of the Mailloux test does result in greater flex-
ibility for school authorities than the Keefe and Parducci tests.9 8 A
contract analysis similar to that in Mercer examines questions of
custom, expectations, language interpretation, and reasonableness
of remedy. Notwithstanding the varying approaches to academic
freedom for schoolteachers, each court in the cases above would
allow school authorities to discipline teachers for discussing sub-
jects outside the specified curriculum-even those courts that af-
ford constitutional status to pedagogical decisions.
Two years after Mercer, in Wilson v. Chancellor,99 the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon addressed an issue
akin to speaking on a subject not approved for the curriculum.
Wilson, a high school political science teacher, invited four speak-
ers-a Democrat, a Republican, a Communist and a member of the
John Birch Society-to share their views with the class. The prin-
cipal and school board discussed and approved the plan. Three of
the speakers appeared without incident, but a group of parents
protested the invitation to the Communist. After a heated debate
and before the Communist was scheduled to appear, the school
board issued an order banning "all political speakers" from the
high school. Wilson challenged the board's action on the basis of
the first and fourteenth amendments and on vagueness and over-
breadth grounds. 10
The court held that the choice of a teaching method is a form of
expression within the meaning of the free speech clause: "The act
of teaching is a form of expression, and the methods used in teach-
ing are media [for that expression]."101 The court made no attempt
to define a special "academic freedom" based upon the occupa-
tional status of teachers, nor did it draw any distinction between
high school and college teachers.0 2 Reasoning that teaching was
98. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
99. 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976).
100. Id. at 1361.
101. Id. at 1363.
102. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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protected speech, 103 the court asserted that the protected right was
personal to the teacher, and not defined, as in Mailloux, by refer-
ence to larger community interests.
Wilson's right to choose materials-in this case speakers-for his
class formed the basis of the decision, not the right of the invited
Communist to speak or the students' rights to hear. The teacher's
right to choose materials was subject to reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions. 0 4 But the court found that the restriction in
Wilson was unreasonable because it did not relate to a valid educa-
tional purpose, and because the school board enacted the regula-
tion in response to political pressure. 0 5 The court in Wilson ig-
nored the myriad concerns that characterized Mailloux and
Mercer, and adopted a straightforward approach similar to the one
in Parducci.0° Teaching is expression protected by the first
amendment. Therefore, limitations on that expression raise prima
facie constitutional issues that courts should subject to careful
scrutiny.
The issues raised in the previously discussed cases converged in
Cary v. Board of Education of Adams-Arapahoe School Dis-
trict.10 7 The plaintiffs in Cary were high school English instructors
who taught various elective courses on contemporary literature and
poetry. A dispute arose when the school board removed ten books
from a list of 1275 recommended for high school usage. All the par-
ties agreed that the proscribed books were not obscene and that, as
a group, they did not represent any particular "system of thought
or philosophy.' 08 The teachers argued that the ban unconstitu-
tionally invaded their right to academic freedom. The court de-
scribed the opposing views of the teachers and school board mem-
bers as irreconcilable: "The logical extension of plaintiffs'
103. This approach begs a host of questions. See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying
text.
104. "[S]chool boards may restrict teachers' expression if the restrictions are reasonable
in light of the special circumstances of the school environment." 418 F. Supp. at 1364.
105. The court was not content to stop at this point. It also found that the ban was an
unconstitutional prior restraint, void for vagueness, and violative of the equal protection
clause because it discriminated against political science teachers and their students. Id. at
1364-67.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
107. 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
108. 427 F. Supp. at 947-48.
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contention is that they can teach without accountability to their
employer.. . . The logical extension of defendants' contention is
that they have the power to cause teachers to teach from a pre-
pared script." 109
The court noted that academic freedom was an adaptation of
first amendment rights of free speech and press intended "to pro-
tect communication in the classroom as a special market place of
ideas."' 10 The court cited two Supreme Court cases that had noth-
ing to do with curriculum control,1 and concluded that academic
freedom was "such a widely held belief and traditional view that it
is unlikely that a board of regents or other public authority would
even attempt to deny a college professor the authority and respon-
sibility to select the materials to be used in his classes."112 Even if
one accepts the court's characterization of academic freedom, the
Constitution does not protect automatically every interest that
custom or tradition recognizes.
The court also noted that academic freedom does not have the
same meaning in high schools that it has in universities because of
fundamental institutional differences. s The court in Cary rejected
the rationales of Keefe and Parducci because those rationales in-
109. Id. at 949.
110. Id.
111. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (overturning application of New
York's Feinberg Law, 1949 N.Y. Laws 360, current version at N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3022 (Mc-
Kinney 1970), which prohibited employment of anyone as a public school teacher who was a
member of an organization advocating the overthrow of the government "by force, violence
or any unlawfulmeans"); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (overturning con-
tempt citation for refusal of Mr. Sweezy to answer questions from New Hampshire's attor-
ney general, at instance of the legislature, about a lecture he gave at the University of New
Hampshire, and about his membership in the Progressive Party). Both cases contain discus-
sions of academic freedom, but neither deals with state interference in curricular or peda-
gogical disputes.
112. 427 F. Supp. at 949. Closely related problems arose in a suit brought by a political
science professor who charged that the University of Maryland improperly denied him a
position as Chairman of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of
Maryland because of his admittedly Marxist political beliefs, and because of the fear that
those beliefs might affect his choice of teaching materials. Ollman v. Toll, 518 F. Supp. 1196
(D. Md. 1981). The district court found that the plaintiff had not met his burden of proving
that his beliefs were a substantial or motivating factor in the denial. Id. at 1214.
113. The court recognized the significant substantive differences in purpose, form, con-
tent of instruction, and age and sophistication of the students. See supra note 74. Interest-
ingly, the court did not cite Mailloux.
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volved a substantive analysis of the teaching methodology and as-
signment.114 The court apparently believed that if society wishes to
protect academic freedom in high schools, controversies about its
scope cannot be resolved by judicial review of the quality or char-
acter of the communications involved.
The court in Cary adopted a fundamentally different approach
from that followed by the court in Mailloux. The quality of the
instruction was critical to the analysis in Mailloux. In Cary, the
court determined that the Constitution would not countenance
such judicial review, because the issue involved the right to choose,
and not the right to choose subject to judicially imposed qualita-
tive standards. Although the court's interpretation of its role in a
suit alleging speech infringement has some support,11 5 neverthe-
less, courts regularly do review the content of questioned speech
within a particular context to determine the reasonableness of a
challenged regulation.110 For example, courts often determine
whether certain material is obscene,117 whether the effect of alleg-
edly obscene material is greater on children than it is on adults,1 '
whether commercial speech is "truthful and legitimate,"1119 and
whether certain speech represents a "clear and present" danger.1 20
Cary also addressed the arguments raised in an article by Pro-
fessor Goldstein.121 The court attempted to develop a theoretical
basis for protecting a high school teacher's control over teaching
methodology and content. The court noted that Professor Gold-
114. "The institutional role of the court is to determine whether the Constitution controls
who has the authority to choose in a given context, and what are the constitutional limita-
tions on the power of the decision-maker. The quality of the decision is irrelevant." 427 F.
Supp. at 950.
115. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
116. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
117. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Penthouse v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d
1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980), illustrates the detail with which courts
examine the content of allegedly obscene publications.
118. See New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968).
119. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Hunter, Prescription Drugs and Open Housing: More on Commercial
Speech, 25 EMORY L.J. 815, 825-35 (1976); cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981) (examining validity of ordinance prohibiting outdoor advertising displays).
120. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
121. Goldstein, supra note 21.
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stein "apparently believes that the function of all public education
is the implantation of a set of societal values, and therefore, deci-
sions about what is to be taught in those schools are community
decisions to be made through the democratic process.1 22 This
statement does not capture fully the scope of Professor Goldstein's
article, although Goldstein gives great weight to value-inculcation
as a goal of public education. 123 At the elementary school level, the
court apparently agreed with Goldstein. The state, having forced
children to leave direct parental control at an early age, must pro-
vide not only basic skills, but also must support majoritarian val-
ues. 124 In high schools, the court noted that the Constitution man-
dates a different approach. High schools should expose students to
conflicting viewpoints and allow students to engage in decision-
making, thus encouraging independence and free thought.
As the student advances in age, experience, information, and
skills, the need for controlling the educational environment di-
minishes. Assuming an adequate initiation into the fundamen-
tals, the secondary school student must be given an opportunity
to participate openly if he is to become the kind of self-con-
trolled, individually motivated and independent-thinking person
who can function effectively as a contributing citizen in a society
of ordered liberty.125
Despite the court's criticisms of Professor Goldstein, the two po-
sitions do not differ significantly. The court recognized that the
cognitive development of most high school students is sufficient to
enable them to analyze conflicting viewpoints and to confront the
marketplace of ideas. Full enjoyment of citizenship requires an
ability to make intellectual choices; high school is the last opportu-
nity to train many students to make such choices. Thus, the court
took a central value of the system of free expression-the market-
place of ideas-and contended that high school students should re-
ceive practical training in the full development of this value. Such
a contention is consistent with Professor Goldstein's position that
the inculcation of values is the primary purpose of public
122. 427 F. Supp. at 952.
123. Goldstein, supra note 21.
124. 427 F. Supp. at 952.
125. Id. at 953.
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education.
The court in Cary believed that the Constitution entitles high
school teachers to some degree of flexibility in determining course
content and teaching methodology. But the conclusion that some
limited Lehrfreiheit exists at the secondary school level finds sup-
port not in the individual instructor's interest in free speech, but
in the societal interest of developing student respect for the values
of free speech. Such a position is similar to the reasoning in Mail-
loux. Carried to its logical conclusion, this position could lead to
mandated dissent, or a kind of "fairness doctrine" for high
schools.12 Despite the court's contention in Cary, the crux of the
case is not a teacher's freedom, but rather the public's interest in
developing a certain mode of thinking. Furthermore, the court
failed to define adequately the scope of the freedom an individual
teacher should have in pursuing and developing the marketplace of
ideas within the classroom.
The court's discussion in Cary was moot because the teacher and
his colleagues had organized a labor union that negotiated a collec-
tive bargaining agreement effective for the year in which the book-
banning issue arose. The agreement granted the school board the
right to "[d]etermine the processes, techniques, methods and
means of teaching any and all subjects.11 27 The court concluded
that the teachers had bargained away any right that they had to
determine course content:
Whatever may be the scope of the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments for a freedom to communicate with
students, directly in a classroom speech or indirectly through
reading assignments, such protection does not present a legal
impediment to the freedom to contract .... One can, for con-
sideration, agree to teach according to direction.1 28
Both sides appealed the district court's judgment, and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed on other grounds.12 9 The Tenth Circuit read the
collective bargaining agreement more narrowly, and concluded that
126. The fairness doctrine developed in the context of governmental regulation of access
to the electronic media. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
127. 427 F. Supp. at 948.
128. Id. at 955-56.
129. 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
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the agreement did not give the school board unfettered control
over course materials. Moreover, the agreement did not amount to
a surrender of any individual constitutional rights that the teach-
ers may have possessed .1 3  The appellate court was unclear in
reaching its conclusions. The court might have been construing the
contract in such a way as to avoid the question of constitutional
infringement, or might have been confronting the constitutional is-
sue. But to suggest, as a matter of contract law, that a person can-
not agree to limit his expression for good consideration is an un-
usual position. The opinion does not indicate adequately which
line of reasoning the court pursued.
The Tenth Circuit agreed that teachers have certain constitu-
tional interests in academic freedom that were implicated by the
school board's decisions. On the facts, however, the court did not
find a constitutional violation. Although the teachers could not as-
sign certain books, the school board had not banned the books
from the school libraries or from classroom discussion. Further-
more, the court noted that the courses were electives, and were in
the curriculum at the school board's discretion.13 1 Thus, the board
could remove the courses from the curriculum, mooting any con-
cern with individual teaching methodology.13 2 The court expressly
approved of value inculcation as a principal function of public edu-
cation. "It is legitimate for the curriculum of the school district to
reflect the value system and educational emphasis which are the
130. "We thus construed the contract as giving control over textual material to the school
board insofar as it can be done consistent with the federal and Colorado constitutions." Id.
at 539.
131. Id. at 544.
132. One judge would have required that the board show that the exclusion was not arbi-
trary. Id. (Doyle, J., concurring). The court's observation raises an interesting issue. Under
appropriate circumstances, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning suggests that the court would fol-
low Keefe, Parducci, and Mailloux in finding that the school board could not prohibit a
teacher from using or discussing particular books. That is, if the teachers in Cary had not
contracted away their right to determine course content, and if the school board had not
only proscribed the books, but had also proscribed classroom discussion and removed the
books from the school library, the Tenth Circuit might have found a constitutional viola-
tion. In their concurring opinions in Epperson, Justices Black and Stewart both maintained
that a school board could constitutionally delete entire subjects from the curriculum. See
supra text accompanying notes 32-40. Thus, the school board might be powerless to delete
particular books while having absolute discretion to delete the courses in which the books
would be used.
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collective will of those whose children are being educated and who
are paying the costs." 133 The Tenth Circuit thus involved itself in
direct curricular review, similar to that undertaken by the courts
in Keefe, Parducci, and Mailloux, while simultaneously accepting
the notion of ultimate school board control over the curriculum.
The views expressed by the Tenth Circuit in Cary echoed the
court's earlier decision in Adams v. Campbell County School Dis-
trict." In Adams, the court upheld the nonrenewal by the school
board of the contracts of three untenured teachers. The court con-
fused the question of curriculum control and pedagogy, however,
with questions of behavioral control and insubordination. The
teachers had filed a civil rights action claiming that the
nonrenewals constituted punishment for their expression of minor-
ity viewpoints in the classroom.' The school board contended
that it had based the nonrenewals on various disciplinary
problems. e36 One of the grounds stated by the school board-that
an English teacher discussed current events in her class-had some
similarity to a pedagogical dispute.13 7 The trial court found that
the school board based the nonrenewals on legitimate employer-
employee contractual grounds, and the appellate court refused to
133. Id. at 543 (citing Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir.
1975)).
134. 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975).
135. Even an untenured teacher has a right" not to be dismissed for exercising constitu-
tional rights. 511 F.2d at 1246 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)); see Picker-
ing v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974);
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S.
207 (1971). But cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
136. One teacher played records in his classroom so loudly that it disturbed other classes.
Another teacher had confrontations with another faculty member and the principal. The
third teacher maintained no classroom discipline. Id. at 1243-44.
137. Id. The resemblance exists only in the sense that the stated ground was directly
related to the learning experience. Even those persons who favor broad academic freedom
for high school teachers would not argue that someone hired to teach English may disregard
grammar, Shakespeare, and Thomas Hardy in favor of politics, economics, or algebra.
The interests that some teachers believe should receive constitutional protection can
strain credulity. See, e.g., East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d
Cir. 1977) (dress code for teachers is constitutional); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d
973 (7th Cir. 1974) (nonrenewals based on distribution to students of "Woodstock" brochure
containing paean to free sex, LSD, and marijuana were constitutional); Moore v. School Bd.,
364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (nonrenewal of contract constitutional when teacher dis-
cussed his personal experiences with a Japanese prostitute and questioned students about
frequency of masturbation).
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disturb that finding15 8 The Tenth Circuit stated further:
Plaintiffs also argue that teachers have a First Amendment right
to discuss controversial subjects and use controversial materials
in the classroom. Undoubtedly they have some freedom in the
techniques to be employed, but this does not say that they have
an unlimited liberty as to structure and content of the courses,
at least at the secondary level. Thus in a small community like
Gillette the Board members and the principal surely have a
right to emphasize a more orthodox approach, for example, and
it would seem that they may insist that record playing and cur-
rent events do interfere with this program. We have found no
law which allows a high school teacher to have the broad lati-
tude which appellants seek.'"s
The Tenth Circuit in Adams found a community interest, ex-
pressed through the politically sensitive school board, in maintain-
ing control over curriculum and pedagogy. This conclusion does
not answer fully the question of how much latitude a teacher has
within his classroom. It does put that question within the context
of a larger community interest in the educational process, however,
and places the community's concerns above the teacher's interest
in self-expression. The Tenth Circuit could have decided Adams
without the additional rhetoric quoted above because Adams es-
sentially involved teacher insubordination and incompetence. Al-
though Adams represents another struggle with the assertion of in-
dividual rights, the court's decision reflects larger societal and
institutional concerns.
138. 511 F.2d at 1246.
139. Id. at 1247 (footnote omitted). The court relied on Semard v. Board of Educ., 473
F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973) (school board may demand more than mere competent classroom
instruction); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972) (no constitutional right to over-
ride judgment of superiors as to proper course content), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973);
Flicker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1972) (permissible to termi-
nate two college teachers in favor of ones with better qualifications); Drown v. Portsmouth
School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971) (nonrenewal legitimate when teacher's methods
are too unconventional); Knarr v. School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (legiti-
mate to terminate teacher for being chronically late, advising students to disobey dress
codes, using classroom as personal forum, and being rude to other teachers), afl'd, 452 F.2d
649 (1971).
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C. Students and the Right to Receive
One justification for providing first amendment protection for a
speaker's utterances is the concomitant "right to hear" of his lis-
teners. 140 Courts have defined a "right to know" as an independent
basis for challenging the actions of school authorities, especially
when the controversy has involved the selection of books for school
libraries or course bibliographies.141 Many courts have discussed
the right to know, but few courts have explained the concept.
Courts invoke the right to know in four distinct situations: when
the government seeks to limit the speech of a citizen, raising con-
cern about the speaker's free speech rights and the opportunity for
his potential audience to hear him; when the government possesses
information to which a citizen seeks access, usually under the Free-
dom of Information Act 42 or similar state "sunshine" and "open
records" laws;148 when a citizen seeks admittance to government-
owned or government-controlled property;144 and when the govern-
ment provides inadequate or limited information through a service,
or terminates the service altogether. This last situation may in-
volve the "public utility" concept.1 45 The right to know, or to re-
ceive information, influenced the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision that a school board's removal of library books vio-
lated the first amendment because the removal was content
140. -See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Bates v. Arizona State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 183-254. See also, Note, School Board Removal
of Books from Libraries and Curricula, 30 KAN. L. R.v. 146 (1981); Note, Schoolbooks,
School Boards and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1092 (1980); Note, First Amend-
ment Limitations on the Power of School Boards to Select and Remove High School Text
and Library Books, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 457 (1978).
142. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
143. Other statutes offer varying degrees of access. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Am. § 286.011
(West 1975 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-14-1 to -4 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
318.9 to 318.18 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-44-101 to -107 (1980 & Supp. 1981).
144. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
145. The closest analogy is the system of federal control over the electronic media. See 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of the public utility concept, see
infra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 25:1
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF TEACHERS
based. 14
1. The Right to Hear as a Corollary of the Right to Speak
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,1 47 the Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional a Virginia statute 48 prohibiting pharmacists from advertis-
ing prescription drugs. Although the statute limited speech by
pharmacists, the state justified the limitation by citing the Su-
preme Court decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen,149 which held
that "commercial speech" lies outside the scope of the first amend-
ment. Virginia Pharmacy overruled Chrestensen and afforded
commercial speech constitutional protection.150
The facts in Virginia Pharmacy forced the Court to consider
whether the right to speak also encompasses a right to hear. The
plaintiffs who challenged the statute were not the pharmacists who
would bear any burden imposed for a violation; rather, they were a
group of consumers who argued that the statute's prohibition
against advertising by pharmacists unconstitutionally deprived
them of an opportunity to receive information. The Court over-
came a thorny standing problem by concluding that a necessary
corollary of the right to speak is the right to hear the speaker, and
that interference by the state with one right is also interference
with the other.1 51
146. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799
(1982). See infra text accompanying notes 186-225.
147. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
148. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974).
149. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For earlier criticism of Chrestensen, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-06 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Gardner,
Free Speech in Public Places, 36 B.U.L. REv. 239 (1956).
150. Although the Court held that commercial speech is entitled to first amendment pro-
tection, the Court maintained a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
and allowed greater regulation of the former. 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24. See L. TRmE, supra
note 14, § 12-15, at 655-56.
151. This was the most straightforward enunciation of the proposition, but it was not
novel. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); T. EMERSoN, TowARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-11 (Vintage ed. 1967); Note, Freedom of Ex-
pression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1191 (1965). But cf. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding Attorney General's statutory denial of nonimmi-
grant visa to alien journalist who advocated communism, and rejecting first amendment
right of American citizens to hear him speak). Professor Tribe suggests, however, that
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The Court's approach in Virginia Pharmacy is well-founded.
Free speech would be a meaningless concept if the state, while dis-
regarding the speaker, could prevent the audience from hearing
what the speaker had to say. Speaking and listening are interde-
pendent concepts, a notion recognized in the twin principles of
Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit, although the German concepts have
somewhat broader overtones. 152
The Court's concern with the free flow of information from
speaker to listener continued in several cases after Virginia Phar-
macy.151 Despite the real and apparently lasting concern for the
free receipt of information by listeners, however, the cases did not
advance significantly the analysis of constitutional interests within
the classroom. If Virginia Pharmacy is the model, the right of the
teacher to speak necessarily defines the students' right to hear. As
one court noted, "[t]he right to receive information in the free
speech context is merely the reciprocal of the right of the
speaker.1 54 A limitation imposed on a teacher may provide a basis
for an independent action by students who allege that the limita-
tion unconstitutionally restricts the teacher's free speech and,
therefore, interferes with the students' right to hear. Virginia
Pharmacy does not enlarge the teacher's right to speak, however,
by recognizing a reciprocal right to hear whatever may rightfully
be spoken.
2. Government Control of Access to Information and Places
The access cases differ fundamentally from Virginia Pharmacy
and its progeny.155 Those cases that have involved questions of ac-
Kleindienst is not authority to the contrary. L. TRME, supra note 14, § 15-15, at 957-58
n.25.
152. See W. VON HUMBOLr, supra note 6.
153. Most notable are: Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (invalidating a ban
on lawyer advertising); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(invalidating a prohibition on posting "For Sale" and "Sold" signs); and First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating a state ban on certain forms of political advocacy
by corporations).
154. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School, 475 F. Supp. 615, 620 (D. Vt. 1979).
155. See supra note 153. A thorough discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally Note, Press Access to Government-Controlled Information and the
Alternative Means Test, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1279 (1981); Comment, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Act-1981, 1982 DuKE L.J. 423; Comment, Newsgathering: Sec-
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cess to areas under direct governmental control, such as jails, have
held uniformly that no general constitutional right of access exists
within the first or fourteenth amendments. 151 In the latest Su-
preme Court decision considering the access issue, Houchins v.
KQED,1 57 the Court divided sharply. s15  But courts generally agree
that safety and national security may justify limitations on the
right of access,"59 and that the press enjoys the same right of access
as the general public.160
The "public forum" cases, on the other hand, have long recog-
nized a general right of access to public parks, lands, buildings,
and streets for the purpose of engaging in free speech activities,
subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations."6 1 The
"petition and assembly" clause contemplates such activities. But a
considerable difference exists between allowing Nazis to engage in
political expression by marching in Skokie, Illinois162 and allowing
a person to explore a government establishment to satisfy his own
curiosity, even if he directs his curiosity toward the goal of becom-
ing a more informed citizen.
In 1980, the Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia63
ond-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms, 53 Tax. L. REv. 1440 (1975).
156. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974).
157. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
158. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist found no constitutional ba-
sis for a right of access. 438 U.S. at 14. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, but did
not join the majority. Id. at 16. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Powell filed a strong dissent.
Id. at 19. Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate. Id. at 16.
159. National security also may provide a basis for upholding a prior restraint. See
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), motion to reconsider and
to vacate preliminary injunction denied, 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis.), writ of mandamus for
expedited appeal denied sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709, dismissed as moot,
610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
160. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Some limitations on the use of recording
devices may have the practical effect of limiting opportunities for electronic-media report-
ers. See Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978);
Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Md. House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 310 A.2d 156 (1973). Cf.
Nevens v. City of Chino, 233 Cal. App. 2d 775, 44 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1965).
161. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S.
564 (1970); Cox v. Louisiana [Cox II], 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana [Cox I], 379
U.S. 536 (1965).
162. See National Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Collin v. Smith,
447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), afl'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
163. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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held that the first amendment provides a right of access to crimi-
nal trials. This decision followed the Court's decision a year earlier
in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale'64 that no right of access exists to a
pretrial suppression hearing in a criminal case. The Court in Rich-
mond Newspapers left standing its decision in Gannett,65 indicat-
ing that the scope of the right of access to criminal proceedings is
not absolute.168 The Court in Richmond Newspapers based the
right of access to criminal proceedings on Anglo-American tradi-
tions of criminal due process. 67 Little case law now exists to sup-
port an expansion of the impact of Richmond Newspapers beyond
the area of criminal trials.
Although these cases have little direct relationship to issues of
school curricula and teaching methods, they demonstrate that the
term "right to know" might have widely different meanings and
consequences in various contexts. Furthermore, the arguments
favoring greater access to government-controlled information and
places are consistent with the arguments favoring greater student
demand for educational offerings, and for access to school re-
sources based upon a student's purported right to know. These ar-
guments have been especially important in the school library cases
discussed below. 1
68
3. The "Public Utility" Concept
Some courts maintain that if the state provides an educational
system, it must provide not only space for all children who want to
attend, but also access to a full range of information and educa-
tional opportunities.16 This approach may be called the "public
164 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
165. 448 U.S. at 564.
166. See San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal.3d 498, 638 P.2d 655, 179
Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982) (exclusion of press and public from preliminary hearings upon request
of criminal defendant not unconstitutional). But see United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d
1208 (9th Cir. 1982) (press and public have first amendment right of access to voir dire in
criminal cases); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 5506 (3d Cir. 1982) (press and public have
first amendment right of access to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment
hearings).
167. 448 U.S. at 569.
168. See infra notes 183-254 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D.
Mass. 1978).
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utility" concept as it is similar to the requirements placed on elec-
tric, gas, and water companies which either are owned by the gov-
ernment or operate as highly regulated monopolies. The approach
often may appear politically desirable, and is reflected in the
proliferation of American educational institutions. Virtually every
American citizen is now within commuting distance of a post-sec-
ondary school.
A federal district court in Right to Read Defense Committee v.
School Committee170 noted that a school "should be a readily ac-
cessible warehouse of ideas." Few would disagree that public
schools should provide a sound and broad education if taxpayers
are willing to provide the necessary funds. But the case law sug-
gests that the Constitution does not compel the government to
provide educational opportunities.
The Supreme Court decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez17 2 is a prime example. In Rodriguez, a
divided Court decided that the Texas system of financing public
schools did not violate the equal protection clause, even though the
system reflected gross discrepancies in per capita expenditures
among school districts. Like most states, Texas largely financed
public schools through property taxes, and the available revenues
varied with the tax base and the applicable tax rates. Despite some
attempts at equalization by state officials, qualitative differences in
education persisted between tax-poor and tax-rich districts. A
member of the majority characterized the Texas system as "chaotic
and unjust,"17 but the system withstood an equal protection chal-
lenge for three reasons: the alleged discrepancies were among
school districts, not individuals, and therefore the plaintiffs did not
170. Id. at 710. In Arundar v. DeKalb County School Dist., 620 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1980),
the complainant asserted a "right" to enroll in certain courses to which he had been denied
access. He argued that he needed the courses to acquire background knowledge for ad-
vanced study in a highly technical field. The court rejected his argument. Id. at 495.
171. Although the United States Constitution may not compel the government to provide
educational opportunities, some state constitutions explicitly do so. For example, Connecti-
cut's constitution declares that "[t]here shall always be free public elementary and secon-
dary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropri-
ate legislation." CONN. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1.
172. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
173. Id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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represent an identifiable class;1 74 wealth is not a suspect classifica-
tion, such as race, which would invoke strict scrutiny;1 75 and edu-
cation is not a fundamental right.17 6
The Court in Rodriguez, however, did not rule out a constitu-
tional basis for compelling the state to provide educational oppor-
tunities. The Court suggested that the Constitution might require
the state to provide "some identifiable quantum of education [as] a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise"
of the right to speak or the right to vote.17 7 The Court implied that
some education may be necessary for the meaningful exercise of
certain fundamental liberties, and that the state must meet this
minimum requirement. Similarly, the Court hinted that Texas
children might invoke the Constitution if subjected to "an absolute
denial of educational opportunities.' 17 A teacher's cause of action
based on the dicta in Rodriguez would be circumscribed and would
not support a "right to know" sufficient to provide a basis for any
sophisticated analysis of curriculum or pedagogy.
The Court's recent decision in Plyler v. Doe 9 may aid interpre-
tation of the dicta in Rodriguez. In Plyler, the Court held that a
state must permit children of resident illegal aliens to attend pub-
lic schools. 80 The Court apparently relied on the premise that the
illegal alien children would continue to live in this country and, if
the state denied them educational opportunities, they would not be
able to participate properly in the American social order.' 8' The
Court's opinion had two related lines of reasoning: education
174. Id. at 22-23.
175. The Court noted that if a state charged tuition at public schools and then refused to
provide financial assistance to indigents, a much stronger justification for judicial involve-
ment would exist. Id. at 25 n.60. Additional cases on the issue of wealth include Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
176. 411 U.S. at 35. Justice Brennan argued that education is a penumbral right, such as
privacy or freedom of association, because education is intertwined inextricably with the
exercise of voting rights and free speech. Id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 36.
178. Id. at 37.
179. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
180. See id. at 230. But cf. Martinez v. Bynum, 103 S. Ct. 1838 (1983) (school district may
deny tuition-free admission to student who lives apart from person having lawful control of
student, if student's presence in district is for primary purpose of attending public schools).
181. Id. at 221-22.
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would benefit the children by helping them obtain good jobs and
become good citizens; and education would benefit society by so-
cializing the children and preventing them from becoming wards of
the state.182 Although Plyler rested on equal protection grounds,
the decision reflected the suggestion in Rodriguez that the state
must provide some minimal education. This line of thought sur-
faces again in the school library cases.
4. The School Library Cases
Against this background, lower courts have decided a number of
cases involving the policies of school boards with regard to text-
books, reading lists, and library acquisitions or deletions.183 These
cases indicate substantial agreement about two points."8 First,
school managers have considerable discretion in choosing books for
school use and in approving books for reading lists. Second, a
school is not constitutionally required to have a library. The courts
have divided sharply, however, over deletion policies. 85 These two
factors led to the recent Supreme Court decision in Board of Edu-
cation, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico.'88
The Court in Island Trees found a first amendment constraint on
school library deletion practices. The nine justices filed seven opin-
ions, and none attracted a majority.
In Island Trees, several junior and senior high school students
challenged the school board's limitation of access to one book, and
the removal of eight others from the school libraries. Three mem-
bers of the Island Trees school board had attended a 1975 confer-
ence sponsored by Parents of New York United, described by Jus-
182. Id. at 221-24.
183. See Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980);
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); President's Coun-
cil, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
998 (1972); Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980); Bicknell v. Vergen-
nes Union High School, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469
F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp.
703 (D. Mass. 1978).
184. See generally Note, School Board Removal of Books from Libraries and Curricula,
30 U. KAN. L. REv. 146 (1981); Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards and the Constitution, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1092 (1980).
185. See infra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
186. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
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tice Brennan as "a politically conservative organization of parents
concerned about education legislation in the State of New
York.1187 At that meeting the board members obtained a list of
books considered objectionable and inappropriate for schools.
They later found nine of these books 18 in the local high school
library and one in the junior high school.' The three board mem-
bers prevailed upon the school principals to give them the books to
read."' Subsequently, an outside review committee also read the
books. The committee made a mixed recommendation,' 9 and the
board decided to return one book, 9 2 to put one on restricted ac-
cess, e19 and to ban the remaining books.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted the school board's motion for summary judgment. 9 4
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded.9 5 The Second Circuit noted that the
removal issue posed constitutional questions and that the com-
plaint raised factual issues that should not have been decided sum-
marily."9 " The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
Second Circuit's decision.
187. Id. at 2802.
188. A. CHILDRESS, A HERO AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH (1973); E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON
ICE (1968); BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS (L. Hughes ed. 1967); 0. LA FARGE,
LAUGHING Boy (1929); D. MORRIS, THE NAKED APE (1967); P. THOMAS, DOWN THESE MEAN
STREETs (1967); K. VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTER HOUSE FIVE (1974); R. WRIGHT, BLACK Boy
(1945); Go ASK ALICE (1971). In addition, another objectionable book, B. MALAMUD, THE
FIXER (1966), was on a twelfth-grade reading list.
189. A READER FOR WRITERS (J. Archer ed. 1971).
190. When this became public knowledge, the board issued a press release stating that
the board had removed books that were "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and
just plain filthy." 102 S. Ct. at 2803 (quoting the lower court opinion, 474 F. Supp. 387, 390
(E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
191. The committee said that five books should be retained and two books removed. As to
the other books, the committee took no position on one, said that one book should be sub-
ject to parental permission, and could not agree about the remaining two books. 102 S. Ct.
at 2803.
192. 0. LA FARGE, LAUGHING Boy (1929).
193. R. WRIGHT, BLACK BoY (1945).
194. 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
195. 638 F.2d 404, 418 (2d Cir. 1980).
196. Judge Mansfield dissented from the decision, observing that: "the First Amendment
entitles students to reasonable freedom of expression but not to freedom from what some
may consider to be excessively moralistic or conservative selection by school authorities of
library books to be used as educational tools." Id. at 432 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
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Justice White's concurrence provided the necessary fifth vote for
affirmance. His reasoning suggests the narrowness of the particular
holding:
The District Court found that the books were removed from
the school library because the school board believed them "to
be, in essence, vulgar." Both Court of Appeals judges in the ma-
jority concluded, however, that there was a material issue of fact
that precluded summary judgment sought by petitioners. The
unresolved factual issue, as I understand it, is the reason or rea-
sons underlying the school board's removal of the books. I am
not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals on such a
fact-bound issue and hence concur in the judgment of affirm-
ance. Presumably this will result in a trial and the making of a
full record and findings on the critical issues. 197
The other members of the Court, however, engaged in lengthy
discussions of constitutional issues all derived from this fairly sim-
ple factual context. Justice Brennan, writing the plurality opinion,
conceded that school boards are vested with great discretion in the
management of schools. 9" But he also noted that students have
first amendment rights that "may be directly and sharply impli-
cated by the removal of books from the shelves of a school li-
brary."' 99 In reaching this conclusion, he cited Tinker, Epperson,
and Barnette. Those cases certainly stand for the proposition that
schools do not operate independently of the first amendment, but
they are distinguishable from Island Trees. The holding in Tinker
allowed students to express themselves politically at school, sub-
ject to ordinary rules of decorum. 00 Epperson was an establish-
ment clause case20 1 and Barnette was a free exercise case. 2  The
decisions in Epperson that Genesis cannot be incorporated into
the curriculum, and in Barnette that a Jehovah's Witness cannot
197. 102 S. Ct. at 2816 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 474 F. Supp. at
397) (citation omitted). Justice Rehnquist criticized Justice White for avoiding considera-
tion of the constitutional questions and the merits. Traditionally, once four justices agree to
hear a case, it will be decided on the merits. 102 S. Ct. at 2827 n.1 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
198. Id. at 2806.
199. Id. at 2807-08.
200. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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be forced to participate in a patriotic exercise are far from a find-
ing that books must be kept in a school library. This distinction is
brought home when one recognizes that the Constitution does not
require that schools acquire books,203 or that schools provide a
library.
Justice Brennan reasoned that because students have first
amendment free speech rights, they can prevent the removal of
books from the school library. He relied on the "right to receive"
information,20 4 but made an important and unprecedented addi-
tion to that right. The right to receive information prevents gov-
ernment limitations on a reader's access to a writer's works. The
right is merely the reciprocal of the writer's interest in writing. But
Justice Brennan expanded the right: "More importantly, the right
to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaning-
ful exercise of his own rights of speech, press and political
freedom. '205
Knowledge is essential to self-development and the exercise of
political freedoms, but finding a right to receive ideas implies that
an obligation exists on the part of government to provide the ideas
or, at a minimum, to provide the opportunity to receive the ideas.
Virginia Pharmacy and its progeny placed limits on the govern-
ment's power to intrude upon a willing speaker and a willing lis-
tener; the cases placed a restraint on government action.206 Justice
Brennan's approach may compel government action to insure that
the right he defines can be enjoyed fully.
The issue in Island Trees was the removal of a few books from
two school libraries serving students between the ages of twelve
and eighteen. None of the books was obscene,20 7 and, presumably,
the children could buy them at bookstores or order the books from
a catalogue. Moreover, the books were available in the local public
library, which displayed the books during the dispute.20 The
school board did not deny access to the books, nor did it deny the
203. Id. at 2805.
204. "[Tlhe right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment
right to send them ... " Id. at 2808.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
207. 474 F. Supp. 387, 392.
208. 102 S. Ct. at 2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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authors the opportunity to have their books sold to or read by the
students. The school board merely decided that tax revenues no
longer would be spent to keep these books in two school libraries.
Justice Brennan did not express any opinion on whether students
could demand that the school board acquire the books,20 9 but such
an implication arises from his opinion.21 0
Justice Brennan attempted to limit the scope of the right to
receive:
Petitioners [the school board members] rightly possess signifi-
cant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries.
But that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan
or political manner.... Thus whether petitioners' removal of
books from their school libraries denied respondents their First
Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind peti-
tioners' actions. If petitioners intended by their removal deci-
sion to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners
disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in petition-
ers' decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in
violation of the Constitution.
... In brief, we hold that local school boards may not remove
books from school library shelves simply because they dislike
the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to
"prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion. 211
Although Brennan used the word "ideas" in his condemnation of
content-based removals, he apparently meant "political ideas" be-
cause he acknowledged that books could be removed if they were
"pervasively vulgar" or educationally unsuitable for the stu-
209. Id. at 2805.
210. The students might argue that a school that does not have a library must start one.
They also could raise constitutional questions any time an old book was removed to make
room for a new one. Chief Justice Burger noted the logical extension of such an argument-
[I]f the need to have an informed citizenry creates a "right," why is the gov-
ernment not also required to provide ready access to a variety of information?
This same need would support a constitutional "right" of the people to have
public libraries as part of a new constitutional "right" to continuing adult
education.
Id. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2810 (footnote omitted) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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dents.212 Evidently, Brennan's view is that the Constitution does
not mandate a general right to receive ideas. Rather, when the gov-
ernment provides a source of information, government officials
may not provide only those ideas that they prefer. Motivation,
rather than a broad right to receive information, is the key.
This interpretation of Justice Brennan's opinion appears more
reasonable when one considers Justice Blackmun's concurrence.
Blackmun addressed the motivation issue and expressed concern
that a content-based decision to remove books might constitute an
attempt by the state to suppress ideas.
I suggest that certain forms of state discrimination between
ideas are improper.
... [W]e must reconcile the schools' "inculcative" function
with the First Amendment's bar on "prescriptions of
orthodoxy."
In my view, we strike a proper balance here by holding that
school officials may not remove books for the purpose of restrict-
ing access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed
in them, when that action is motivated simply by the officials'
disapproval of the ideas involved.21
Read together, the opinions of Justice Blackmun and Justice
Brennan expand upon a due process right. Generally, the state has
no obligation to provide the funds, or the opportunity, for the ex-
ercise of an individual right.214 Once the state decides to act, the
fourteenth amendment may require the state to provide due pro-
cess before the state can alter its action. The state is not perpetu-
ally bound: the law, regulation, or contract may be amended, modi-
fied, rescinded, repealed, or not renewed. The state's method of
alteration, however, often must comply with constitutional stan-
dards of procedural due process. In many instances, the recipient
212. 102 S. Ct. at 2810. Justice Brennan failed to provide school authorities with any
definition of "pervasive vulgarity" or "educational suitability." Conceivably, the works of
Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Locke, Bentham, Mill, and Lenin could be educationally unsuitable.
213. Id. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
214. See, e.g., Bell v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from medical procedures
that are funded with tax monies constitutional). The general rule has some exceptions. For
example, an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at taxpayers' expense. Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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of a government benefit is treated as having a property interest in
the benefit that cannot be taken without due process; 215 nor can
the benefit be taken away because the recipient exercises his con-
stitutional rights.216 Justice Blackmun and, to a lesser extent, Jus-
tice Brennan implied that a student in a public school has the first
amendment rights of any citizen, subject to reasonable limitations
imposed by age 217 and the need to maintain order in the school.
The Constitution does not require that the school have a library,
or indeed, that there even be a school.2 18 If a school has a library,
however, the first amendment protects a student's use of it. If a
school board restricts library use by removing a book, the action
affects a student's exercise of a first amendment right and requires
proper justification. Proper justification is ambiguous, but cer-
tainly obsolescence or obscenity would be acceptable justifications.
Although this rationale may not explain the two opinions, it places
them within the framework of prior decisions.21 9 In any event, the
language in Justice Brennan's opinion suggests a dramatic shift to
a broader conceptual basis for the student's rights.
The dissenters sharply criticized the suggestion that an entitle-
ment or right of access to school library books exists,220 and argued
vigorously that the local school boards should operate through the
political process with minimal judicial interference.22" ' The dissent-
ers also emphasized that school boards must have broad discretion
to ensure that public schools inculcate values.222 They agreed, how-
ever, that the first amendment does play a role in the operation of
the public schools, and that school boards cannot ignore its
impact.223
215. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). See generally Terrell, supra note 79.
216. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
217. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
218. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
219. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
220. 102 S. Ct. at 2817-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2830-32 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
221. Id. at 2820-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at
2835 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. at 104).
222. 102 S. Ct. at 2823 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 2819-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing with the proposition that "students
do not 'shed their rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' ")
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The dissenters seized upon a glaring fallacy in the plurality's
opinion-the suggestion that the removal of the nine books from
the school library had greater constitutional implications than
school board decisions about curriculum content. Justice Brennan
had stated:
Petitioners emphasize the inculcative function of secondary edu-
cation, and argue that they must be allowed unfettered discre-
tion to "transmit community values" through the Island Trees
schools. But that sweeping claim overlooks the unique role of
the school library. It appears from the record that use of the
Island Trees school libraries is completely voluntary on the part
of students. Their selection of books from these libraries is en-
tirely a matter of free choice; the libraries afford them an oppor-
tunity at self-education and individual enrichment that is whol-
ly optional. Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute
discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty
to inculcate community values. But we think that petitioners'
reliance upon that duty is misplaced where, as here, they at-
tempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the
compulsory environment of the classroom, into the school li-
brary and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds
sway.
224
The dissenters noted that if the plurality feared the suppression
of ideas, the plurality should have been concerned with occur-
rences inside the classroom. A strong authority figure can affect
substantially the lives of his captive audience; ideas can be sup-
pressed more easily in the classroom. In contrast, the school library
is not critical to the functioning of the school. Unwise acquisition
or deletion policies may exist that adversely affect learning and the
development of critical faculties, but these policies are unlikely to
have nearly the impact of decisions concerning curriculum content.
Justice Brennan's premise is unsound as well: Meyer and Epper-
son demonstrate that school boards do not have unfettered discre-
tion over the curriculum.
225
(quoting the plurality opinion, id. at 2807, quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506); 102 S. Ct. at
2834 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 2835 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 2809.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 9-46. Although Justice Blackmun concurred in
the judgment and part of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, he refused to concur in the
[Vol. 25:1
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The Supreme Court's attempt to deal with school library policies
in Island Trees provides few guidelines for implementing constitu-
tional norms. The Court's decision terminated the litigation,22 so
the Court will have no immediate opportunity to reconsider this
particular scenario. But the inability of the Court to reach a con-
sensus reflects previous uncertainty among the lower federal
courts. Prior to Island Trees, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held in President's Council, District 25 v.
Community School Board No. 25 227 that federal courts should
avoid disputes over school library acquisition and deletion policies,
primarily because judicial interference might cause more damage
than simply leaving such issues to the local political process. 228
portion of the opinion that contained this reasoning. 102 S. Ct. at 2814. Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion exhibited greater sensitivity to the application of the first amendment to
the operation of schools. Id. at 2812-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). See also Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (a state
schoolbook selection committee did not have unfettered discretion to select books for class-
room use). &
226. The board of education returned the nine books to the school libraries and instituted
a new procedure by which students could borrow them. When one of the books is checked
out by a student, a note is sent to his parents stating that the book contains material con-
sidered by the board to be inappropriate. Although the parties reached no final agreement
about this procedure, further litigation appears unlikely. Telephone interview with George
Lipp, Counsel to the Board of Education (Nov. 2, 1982).
227. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). In Island Trees, the district
court had relied on President's Council in holding for the school board. Pico v. Board of
Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist: No. 26, 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
228. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont reached a similar result
in Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979). In Bicknell the
school board removed R. PRicE, THE WANDERERS (1974) and P. MANN & L. WALLER, DOG
DAY AFTERNOON (1974) from school libraries after receiving complaints about the books. The
board also restricted the authority of school librarians over book acquisitions. Students, li-
brarians and a committee purporting to represent a variety of interests challenged the
board's action.
The students asserted that the board's policy infringed their "right to know" and interfer-
red with the academic freedom of librarians and teachers. The students argued that Presi-
dent's Council required a showing of educational reasons for removal, prohibiting arbitrary
exercises of discretion. The students also relied on Virginia Pharmacy.
The court in Bicknell held that the right to speak belonged to the authors of the books,
and that the right did not create a basis for compelled state distribution of the author's
ideas. Therefore, a right to speak upon which the students could base their claim of a right
to hear was not present. Bicknell, 475 F. Supp. at 620-21.
The students could have asserted a derivative claim based upon a right of their teachers
or librarians. But no teacher appeared as a named plaintiff, and the court found that the
allegations were too vague and conclusory to state a cause of action. Id. at 621 n.4. The
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, had reached a strikingly different result on similar facts.229
The Sixth Circuit upheld the authority of a school board to choose
books, and found that the faculty had no constitutional right to be
involved in the selection process. 230 The court indicated, however,
that once the school board selected a book, any removal of the
book must meet a constitutional standard of reasonableness; the
book could not be removed simply because it offended the social or
political tastes of school board members.23 ' The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts entered a dispute, and
developed four constitutionally permissible reasons for removing a
book: obsolescence; obscenity; a shortage of shelf space; and im-
proper initial acquisition.232 Lastly, the United States District
court also said that the librarians, as a group, had no independent first amendment right to
control the library collection. Id. at 622 n.5.
Finally, the court rejected a suggestion that the President's Council decision implicitly
required an "articulable educational" reason for the removal of a book. Id. at 620. A federal
court in New Hampshire had previously accepted that interpretation of President's Council.
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979). The court in Presi-
dent's Council used straightforward language, which the court in Bicknell interpreted liter-
ally, to suggest that removal based on controversial content was essentially no different from
removal based on obsolescence or physical deterioration. 457 F.2d 289, 293. The board's
authority was broad and was generally to be left undisturbed. Thus, Bicknell, read with
President's Council, supports broad school board discretion in the acquisition and removal
of books.
229. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
230. Id. at 579-80.
231. The court stated:
Neither the State of Ohio nor the Strongsville School Board was under any
federal constitutional compulsion to provide a library for the Strongsville High
School or to choose any particular books. Once having created such a privilege
for the benefit of its students, however, neither body could place conditions on
the use of the library which were related solely to the social or political tastes
of school board members.
Id. at 582. The court relied on Virginia Pharmacy and reasoned that the acquisition of a
book by the state creates a right of access to that book that the state may not limit without
strong justification. Id. at 583.
232. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D. Mass.
1978). Several difficulties exist with the Right to Read opinion, including the absence of a
clear articulation of the constitutional right infringed by the removal of the book in ques-
tion. The court cited Tinker to support the proposition that removal could be justified only
by "an interest comparable to school discipline." Id. at 713. The court expressed concern for
the possible "sanitizing" of school libraries by successive, increasingly repressive school
boards. Id. at 714. In conclusion, the court stated, "[w]hat is at stake here is the right to
read and be exposed to controversial thoughts and language-a valuable right subject to
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Court for the District of New Hampshire reversed a school board
decision to remove Ms. magazine from the school library.23 3 The
court reasoned that the purchase of a magazine or a book for the
school library created a "privilege" for the students that could not
be divested for reasons "related solely to the social or political
tastes of Board members. ' 234 The court's reliance on Virginia
Pharmacy suggests that the privilege involves some variation of
the right to know, coupled with an entitlement theory.23 5
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.,236 at-
tempted to reconcile these conflicting decisions. The school board
precipitated the litigation by removing books from the schools,
First Amendment protection," id. (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969)).
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court upheld Federal Communication Commission rules that
required broadcast licensees to afford reply time for opposing editorials. Red Lion compels a
private broadcaster to allow access to his broadcast facilities for the expression of views
contrary to his own-a form of state coercion that would not be countenanced but for the
limited availability of air waves, which are licensed by the state for the public benefit. Thus,
if Red Lion is the guide, the court in Right to Read must have applied a public utility
approach to education. If one accepts the proposition of the court in Right to Read that a
"right to. . . be exposed to controversial thoughts and language" exists, then school author-
ities would have a constitutional duty to afford students a general exposure to books and
ideas. But if this is the basis of the court's decision, the duty should apply to acquisition as
well as deletion policies. If the rationale does not apply to acquisitions, then perhaps the
court based its decision on a vested interest, akin to a property right in a book itself, that
students or teachers acquire as soon as the book is purchased for public use.
The court's reasons in Right to Read for justifiable removal also leave open a number of
questions. If a book is legally obscene, it presumably can be removed without objection. The
same should be true if the book is illegally or mistakenly acquired. But the other two rea-
sons-obsolescence and shelf-space shortages-may necessitate detailed content analysis,
and may involve conflicts between school board members and librarians, teachers, or stu-
dents. The removal of one book to make room for another may involve the exercise of sub-
jective value judgments. Unfortunately, the court's reasons for removal may serve as cloaks
for the very motives the court deems impermissible, again opening the door for extensive
judicial intrusion into the educational process.
233. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979). The board objected
to Ms. because: it contained advertisements for sexual aids and contraceptives, as well as
materials related to lesbianism and witchcraft; it contained advertisements promoting The
Guardian, which board members described as a "pro-communist" newspaper; it encouraged
readers to order records made by "known communist folk singers;" and it contained materi-
als not suitable for reading aloud in the classroom. Id. at 1272.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1274.
236. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
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prohibiting the use of certain texts in a course entitled "Women in
Literature," eliminating seven courses from the curriculum, and re-
fusing to rehire two teachers.2 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the
board's actions restricted the plaintiffs' opportunities to learn from
their teachers and to associate with them, thus creating a "chilling
effect on the free exchange of knowledge."2 " The district court dis-
missed the complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction.2 39
The Seventh Circuit agreed that the complaint as written did not
state a constitutional claim. Instead of affirming, however, the Sev-
enth Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the trial court to
dismiss the complaint with leave to amend because the board's ac-
tions might have implicated important constitutional interests. 40
The Seventh Circuit rejected the proposition that the purchase
of a book for the library or for a course makes the book's removal a
prima facie constitutional issue, but the court did not give the
board free rein. The court stated that a school board constitution-
ally could not purge a library of "all material offensive to a single,
exclusive perception of the way of the world," nor could a library
collection be acquired accordingly. 41 Thus, acquisition policies, as
well as removal policies, may implicate constitutional values. Fur-
thermore, the court stated that the school board could not prohibit
a student from buying or reading a particular book and bringing it
to school for discussion.242 The statement, although applied to stu-
dents, is analogous to Justice Stewart's conclusion in Epperson
that a school board could not discipline a teacher for mentioning a
respected body of thought, even though it might be beyond the
prescribed curriculum.243
237. Id. at 1302. The troublesome books were: I. LEVIN, THE STEPFORD WIVES (1972);
GROWING Up FEMALE IN AMERICA (E. Merriam ed. 1973); S. PLATH, THE BELL JAR (1971); Go
ASK ALICE (1972); and a textbook entitled VALUES CLARIFICATION (S. Simon ed. 1978). The
board also promulgated a policy prohibiting the use of materials "that might be objectiona-
ble", causing excisions to be made in R. Cox & S. LEWIS, THE STUDENT CRITIC (1974), a high
school text. 631 F.2d at 1302.
238. 631 F.2d at 1302-03.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1308-09.
241. Id. at 1308.
242. Id. Under Tinker, however, school authorities may place reasonable limitations on
the use of a book in order to avoid disruption. Also, they legitimately could ban pornogra-
phy from the campus.
243. 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The court in Zykan recognized that schools are important insti-
tutions for value inculcation and that considerable local discretion
is necessary to insure the maintenance and propagation of basic
community values. Moreover, most public school students are not
fully developed intellectually; they lack the cognitive abilities nec-
essary to make rational value decisions from among a host of com-
peting and conflicting choices.2 44 Nevertheless, relying on Virginia
Pharmacy, the court stated that "[s]econdary school students cer-
tainly retain an interest in some freedom of the classroom, if only
through the qualified 'freedom to hear' that has lately emerged as
a constitutional concept. ' 245 Thus, despite the deference paid to
local school boards for the purpose of assuring value inculcation,
the court in Zykan concluded that school officials do not operate
without constitutional constraints. The Seventh Circuit noted that
the board's control over extracurricular matters is limited by
"time, place, and manner" qualifications: 46 the board cannot disci-
pline a teacher for random comments that offend school authori-
ties so long as the teacher fulfills his professional duties;247 it can-
not use the curriculum to promote particular religious beliefs;248
and it cannot prohibit the mention of topics relevant to the curric-
ulum and matters under study.249 Students are free to express an
244. 631 F.2d at 1304-05. The court relied on Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)
(upholding a New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a school teacher of any
person not a United States citizen, unless that person has manifested an intention to apply
for citizenship); Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (invalidating a college's refusal to
permit students to form a local SDS chapter and to use college facilities for meetings);
Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979) (school system did not have to
rearrange kindergarten curriculum to suit the religious beliefs of an untenured teacher),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980); Cary v. Board of Educ. of the Adams-Arapahoe School
Dist., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977), afl'd, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979). Healey, a free-
dom of association case, appears to support the plaintiffs' argument and is more akin to
Tinker. It identifies value inculcation as part of the educational process, but only in dicta.
245. 631 F.2d at 1304.
246. Id. at 1305 (citing Tinker and Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied sub nom. Granville Cent. School Dist. v. Thomas, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980)).
247. 631 F.2d at 1305 (citing Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657
(S.D. Tex. 1972)).
248. 631 F.2d at 1305-06 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
249. 631 F.2d at 1305-06. This echoes portions of Justice Stewart's concurrence in Epper-
son. 393 U.S. at 115-16 (Stewart, J., concurring). But see Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of
Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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interest in topics not covered by the curriculum,2 50 although they
are still subject to ordinary rules of discipline. Their freedom also
would not justify classroom discussion of subjects legitimately ex-
cluded from the curriculum. 51 Finally, the court stated that the
school officials cannot impose a "'pall of orthodoxy' . . . which
might either implicate the state in the propagation of an identifi-
able religious creed or otherwise impair permanently the student's
ability to investigate matters that arise in the natural course of
intellectual inquiry. '252 School authorities constitutionally may ap-
ply "social, political and moral tastes to secondary school educa-
tional decisions," but the Constitution prohibits a "systematic ef-
fort to exclude a particular type of thought" or to promote a
uniform ideological preference.253
The court in Zykan based its decision on the student's "right to
know". Because of this right, the court concluded that school
board discretion must be limited, although only slightly, to avoid
ideological indoctrination. According to the court, however, the
right was not the reciprocal of any right to speak. Indeed, the court
held that the students lacked standing to seek redress for the per-
ceived denial of their teachers' rights, and expressed skepticism
that the board's decisions limited any rights of the teachers.254 The
"right to know" found in Zykan differs from that of Virginia
Pharmacy, and suffers from the same conceptual shortcomings as
the "right to know" described by Justice Brennan in Island Trees.
III. THEMES AND COUNTERTHEMES
The decided cases fail to provide any comprehensive scheme for
delineating the role of the Constitution in resolving curricular and
pedagogical conflicts. In many instances, courts have recognized a
250. 631 F.2d at 1306.
251. For instance, a student may freely discuss Evangelical Christianity in the context of
a classroom consideration of religion. He could not use the classroom as a forum to prosely-
tize, but subject to the strictures of Tinker, he might be able to do so in areas outside the
classroom. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (approving a "released time" program
that allowed public school students to attend religious classes at another location during
school hours).
252. 631 F.2d at 1306.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1307-08. The court noted, however, that failure to rehire a particular teacher
may be evidence of an attempt to impose ideological orthodoxy. Id.
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right of free speech for teachers that is partially manifested
through the work of teaching, including the choice of materials and
methods. Nonetheless, the right is subject to rather broad regula-
tion by school authorities. Courts appear reluctant to hold that the
actual work a teacher contracts to perform implicates constitu-
tional values. The Constitution, however, does protect speech
outside the school, within the school but outside the classroom,
and even within the classroom but outside the prescribed curricu-
lum.2 55 Such speech may not serve -as a basis for disciplining a
teacher unless the speech clearly affects the teacher's performance
of his professional duties.258
The school library cases have tried, to some extent, to define stu-
dent interests in book-selection decisions by developing aspects of
the "right to hear" or the more amorphous "right to know." Island
Trees and other "right to know" cases extend Virginia Pharmacy.
They suggest that the first amendment imposes a duty on the
state, acting through the public schools, to provide a balanced cur-
riculum and refrain from limiting student access to library materi-
als and controversial ideas. The cases thus offer a basis for student
assertions of Lernfreiheit, independent of the students' assertion
of any particular rights of the teachers. The cases do not withstand
serious analysis, but their systemic approach to constitutional ad-
judication does comport with prior cases, such as Mailloux, in
which courts have justified the assertion of an individual right by
reference to a communal interest in the quality of education.
The decisions are frustrating because they often gloss over fun-
damental questions by asking an "inflated question. '257 The issue
most often posed is whether the school authorities have placed
limitations on a teacher's freedom to engage in speech activity.
Presented in this manner, the central issue-whether teaching is
itself an activity protected by the first amendment-is simply as-
sumed. The issue becomes the reasonableness of the limitations,
instead of whether a constitutional right even exists. This con-
255. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
256. See, e.g., Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976); Keddie v. Penn-
sylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976); cf. Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp.
802 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Patterson v. Ramsey, 413 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1976) (dealing with
superintendents), aff'd, 552 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1977).
257. The phrase belongs to Prof. Richard Danzig. See Danzig, supra note 47.
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struction assures a case-by-case examination with a heavy burden
of proof on the school authorities to demonstrate the reasonable-
ness of the limitations. 25' A federal judge ultimately decides the
content of high school courses and the methods that may be used
in the classroom. Admittedly, a high school principal should recog-
nize that Kurt Vonnegut is not a pulp writer of pornography. The
principal's failure to do so, however, does not mean that an elev-
enth-grade English teacher with little prior experience should be
free, as a matter of federal constitutional right, to assign books and
materials without regard for the opinions of her superiors. One
may question whether a federal judge is better equipped to make
reading lists for high school juniors than those charged by law with
administering the educational system.2 59
General agreement exists that teaching is a form of speech; at
times, it also may involve freedom of the press. This consensus is
of little aid however. The assertion that teaching involves speech
or press freedoms avoids the definitional problems of symbolic
speech and speech versus conduct, but begs the question of the
extent to which the Constitution protects such activity.26 0 Extor-
tion, fraud, and conspiracy involve speech, but the speech itself is
part of a crime and is not constitutionally protected. An actor is
258. Despite some decisions that put the burden of proof on the teacher as plaintiff, e.g.,
Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curriam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.
1971); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); and Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the school authorities must
bear the expense of disruptions. As one court noted:
In this day and age, school board members and regents are probably exposed
more than any other group to constitutional claims, issues, and arguments in
their day-to-day duties .... Since they are so exposed to these issues, and re-
ceive information, reports, rumors, complaints, and harassment from so many
sources, it is understandable that the Supreme Court has held, in substance,
that the "consideration" of improper or constitutionally protected conduct
does not ipso facto constitute a violation of constitutional rights justifying re-
medial action.
Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978).
259. See Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
260. The Supreme Court has never asserted that all speech is protected speech. Obscen-
ity, for example, is beyond the scope of protected speech. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973). The same was once true of commercial speech. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942). Some other forms of speech, such as libel, though not considered beyond the
protected area, are subject to regulation. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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engaged in a pursuit dependent upon speech; but an actor who
contracts to play the role of Othello is not protected by the first
amendment from a breach of contract action if he decides, for rea-
sons of individual artistic expression, to recite Hamlet's famous so-
liloquy during his climactic murder scene with Desdemona. The
vocal expression of political support for a candidate for elective of-
fice is speech, and a core first amendment value, but the speaker
cannot broadcast his views in a residential neighborhood at two
o'clock in the morning.26' Is there something about education that
mandates full constitutional status for the speech of teachers, or
should the speech be treated as a manifestation of a job that school
officials may control pursuant to statute, regulation, or contract?262
The first, and perhaps most critical, step in answering this ques-
tion entails an examination of the context in which the speech of
teaching arises, and the purposes for which the speech activity is
undertaken.
American public schools provide the educational basis that en-
ables most citizens to deal with the complexities of life in the mod-
ern American socio-political system. The assertion of an absolute
constitutional right to teach whatever material the teacher wants
to teach, in whatever manner he wants to teach it, must be ex-
amined in light of the larger context in which the teaching is tak-
ing place. The same may be said of an assertion of absolute control
by school board members over the school's curriculum.26 3 On the
other hand, one cannot deny the importance to the teacher of the
261. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948).
262. The focus is obviously on public schools because private limitations on speech, unac-
companied by state action, would not raise a first amendment problem. Private schools are
not free, however, from state control. They are subject to accreditation standards that
greatly affect the fashioning of the curriculum. They also must abide by extensive Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) regulations to maintain non-profit status. For example, the IRS de-
nied a tax exemption to Bob Jones University because of its racial policies, even though the
policies were supported by allegedly valid religious beliefs. The Supreme Court upheld the
IRS decision. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). Private, commer-
cially operated nonsectarian schools also may not use race as an admission standard. Run-
yon y. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
263. A school board could not require, for instance, that the curriculum include only
books sympathetic to the Republican Party and critical of the Democratic Party. The Su-
preme Court agreed on that point in Island Trees. 102 S. Ct. at 2810; id. at 2828-29 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
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work in which he is engaged. A conflict exists between the instru-
mentalist value of teaching as a means of providing the education a
citizen needs to survive in a democracy and the individualist value
of teaching as a method of self-expression and self-actualization.2 64
One of the principal functions of the educational system through
the secondary level, often overlooked in the cases and commenta-
ries, is the transmittal of acquired knowledge. Basic mathematics,
grammar, reading, vocabulary, spelling, writing, foreign languages,
and science are not appropriate subjects for intellectual colloquy at
the elementary school level. The subjects often require discipline,
rote memorization, practice, and careful instruction. As students
grow older, their cognitive abilities develop enabling them to deal
more easily with competing ideas and "softer" subjects, such as po-
litical science, sociology, and economics. 6 5 A proper educative pro-
cess should expose students to the problems of making intellectual
choices among conflicting options, and should teach students about
the American system of free expression so that a student can func-
tion effectively in the democratic process. If the educational sys-
tem does not transmit acquired knowledge from one generation to
the next, then other concerns with the schools are of little
consequence. 66
The individual teacher's role in transmitting knowledge is cru-
cial, especially in the lower grades where children are exposed to a
single teacher for nine months. Thus, any right to determine cur-
riculum content must be weighed against the professional and con-
tractual duty to insure an adequate transmittal of information. A
264. See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (discussing the
self-realization value). Cf. Baker, Realizing Self-Realizations: Corporate Political Expendi-
tures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982); Redish, Self-
Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 678 (1982).
265. By "softer" I do not mean less rigorous, only less certain. We know as a matter of
provable fact that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle equals the sum of the
squares of the other two sides, and that it always will, at least in a two-dimensional plane.
We do not know with anything approaching this degree of certainty whether a particular
economic theory, however sound the theoretical justifications, will explain inflation and tell
us how to cure the problem.
266. The Supreme Court may have been suggesting this in Rodriguez by noting the con-
nection between education and the exercise of fundamental rights. See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-
23 (1982).
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conclusion that a teacher is constitutionally entitled to decide cur-
riculum content would make the teacher the ultimate arbiter of
contractual performance. Teachers obviously are important partici-
pants in the educational process because of their professional ex-
pertise, but a system that allows every teacher to determine curric-
ulum content independently would be disjointed, and perhaps
anarchic.
A second function of elementary and secondary education is to
inculcate majoritarian values.267 The state compels school attend-
ance; therefore, the state should not operate schools that disserve
the fundamental values of society. This function, although widely
recognized, has caused considerable controversy. Value inculcation
is often viewed as value indoctrination and as a method of impos-
ing the will of the majority on recalcitrant minorities. The courts
have been solicitous of minority interests that might be supressed
by majoritarian values. Meyer protected a minority interest in pri-
vate language instruction against a majority position favoring a
mono-lingual society. Barnette recognized an individual's freedom
of conscience against a collective interest in patriotic expression.
The school prayer cases prevent the state from favoring a particu-
lar religion despite widespread public sentiment favoring overt re-
ligious expression. Similarly, Tinker protected political dissent
within schools. Recognizing the importance of value inculcation
does not necessarily preclude protection for minority expression.
Rather, the protection of minority interests is itself a form of value
inculcation-respect for and tolerance of minority views.
The purpose of value inculcation and its relationship to the role
of individual teachers in the educational process has received fun-
damentally different treatment from two respected scholars, Pro-
fessor Stephen Goldstein and Professor William Van Alstyne.
Goldstein has maintained:
The central fact in the distinction between higher and lower ed-
ucation is the role of value inculcation in the teaching process.
267. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 21; Diamond, The First Amendment and Public
Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REv. 477 (1981); Nahmod,
First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18
WAYNE L. REv. 1479 (1972); Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individ-
ual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1373 (1976).
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The public schools in the United States traditionally have
viewed instilling the young with societal values as a significant
part of the schools' educational mission. Such a mission is di-
rectly opposed to the vision of education that underlies the
premises of academic freedom in higher education. If the pur-
pose of teaching is to instill values, there would seem to be little
reason for the teacher, rather than an elected school board or
other governmental body ultimately responsible to the public, to
be the one who chooses the values to be instilled. 268
In contrast, Van Alstyne has argued:
Indeed, arbitrary restrictions on alternative sources of informa-
tion or opinion, resulting not from understandable budgetary
constraints or the restraints upon the time available for study
by teachers and students, are precisely what the first amend-
ment disallows. Against a school board decree requiring the in-
culcation of one theory and forbidding mention or examination
of another, for instance, a mere taxpayer should have standing
to contest his compelled financial support for the propagation of
ideas to which he is opposed.... Against a state law provision
that a student might be disciplined for consulting any source of
education save that prescribed in regimented detail, the student
could also succeed on a first amendment claim .... Corre-
spondingly, neither must teachers or professors endure similarly
arbitrary restrictions in the course of their own inquiries or
upon their own communicated classroom references.29
Van Alstyne's comments, although rhetorically appealing, do not
withstand critical inquiry. The first amendment does not necessa-
rily prevent "arbitrary restrictions on alternative sources of infor-
mation or opinion unless a defined right to communicate, to in-
268. Goldstein, supra note 21, at 1342-43 (footnote omitted).
269. Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKE L.J.
841, 857.
270. Professor Goldstein said:
When Professor Van Alstyne, however, uses the term "arbitrary restrictions,"
he apparently does not mean truly "arbitrary" in the sense of having no basis
in reason, but rather, as is often the case in the use of this term, having no
reasonable relationship to what he considers the legitimate ends of curricular
decision making. Under the Van Alstyne view such legitimate ends apparently
do not include value inculcation or "indoctrination."
Goldstein, supra note 21, at 1349 (footnote omitted).
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quire, or to receive information exists. A court can determine
whether such a right exists only from a contextual analysis of the
situation in which the communication occurred. In one sense, the
first amendment requires that the government refrain from inter-
fering with "arbitrary restrictions" on the free flow of information;
it forbids the government to compel speech except in the most lim-
ited circumstances.2 71 The first amendment also does not provide a
constitutional basis for free access to all information in the govern-
ment's possession.171
The definition of "arbitrary restrictions" is also unclear. If a
public school teacher tells his high school English students that a
book by Kurt Vonnegut is forbidden in class, is that an arbitrary
restriction on an alternative source of information, or merely a free
exercise of individual pedagogical expression? The teacher, as a
paid state employee, is no less an agent of the state than the school
principal.
In Van Alstyne's scheme, budgetary and time shortages justify
limitations on the curriculum, but that begs the question of what
limitations are justified. All school systems must operate within
finite temporal and financial limits. The problem of choice is the
critical issue, not the scarcity of resources. The distinction, how-
ever, can be exaggerated. Few would argue with the proposition
that certain basic skills must be taught. Therefore, choices about
matters outside this core curriculum become more narrowly cir-
cumscribed by budgets and schedules.27 3
Van Alstyne's suggestion that a "mere taxpayer" should have
standing to contest the use of taxes for the support of ideas he
opposes expands the federal courts' concept of standing. 74 If every
taxpayer could challenge the government's use of tax monies, a se-
vere impact on the integrity of the legislative and judicial processes
would result.
Generally, a student who is disciplined for consulting materials
271. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
272. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978). The plurality opinion in Island Trees, how-
ever, came close to holding a right of access to such information. See supra text accompany-
ing note 206.
273. See Goldstein, supra note 21, at 1350 n.183.
274. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
1983]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
outside the prescribed curriculum may have cause for complaint.
The context in which the issue arises is critical to a determination
of the appropriate response. A high school student should not be
free to read Playboy during an algebra class. Even in a purely dis-
ciplinary context, however, Tinker mandates a consideration of the
student's free expression interests. Courts have held that a student
also is entitled to some measure of due process in a disciplinary
proceeding. 7 5 Similarly, teachers should be able to follow their
own paths of inquiry in their work, provided that the inquiry does
not interfere with the performance of their job responsibilities and
does not involve questions of moral turpitude. Outside the class-
room, a teacher's actions are personal, although the employer may
have some interest.27 6
None of the foregoing, however, justifies Van Alstyne's conclu-
sion that the first amendment provides a constitutional shield for
utterances by a teacher inside a classroom. Van Alstyne recognizes
that the typical classroom is not a free marketplace of intellectual
exchange.2 7 A teacher has a captive audience, and often can make
or break a student with grades, discipline, and letters of recom-
mendation. A teacher frequently has far greater knowledge of the
material than the students, and easily can humiliate a pupil.
Teachers can start discussions, stop them, conduct a Socratic dia-
logue, or engage in a soliloquy; students are usually in no position
to compete. Thus, the assertion that the Constitution should pro-
tect the teacher and the process of intellectual exchange cannot be
founded on any notion of the classroom as a free marketplace of
ideas.278
A teacher, therefore, should not be accorded the same treatment
as a street preacher or a soapbox politician. The Constitution does
not require that a captive audience of students be subjected to the
pedagogical whims of a multitude of teachers. Van Aistyne is con-
cerned primarily with school board mentalities, not individual
teachers. The teachers, in his view, are the last defense against the
philistinism of rampant majoritarianists who would ban books and
275. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
276. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
277. Van Alstyne, supra note 269, at 856. Thus, he would be willing to dismiss the teacher
who uses the rostrum to promote personal ideology.
278. See generally Diamond, supra note 267, at 496-505.
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keep morality scorecards. Neither school boards nor majorities al-
ways are enlightened, but the defense against possible abuse is not
to cast a constitutional cloak over one set of actors in the drama.
After all, school principals, superintendents, PTA members, and
school board members have interests in expression that may be im-
plicated by the concerns Van Alstyne has suggested.
An individual teacher also may try to impose doctrinal uniform-
ity on students. If Van Alstyne's purpose is to avoid ideological
indoctrination, then the purpose is not served by granting teachers
constitutional protections. The public schools are potentially pow-
erful institutions of indoctrination. Meyer and Epperson are but
two examples of attempts to use the public schools for the propa-
gation of highly particularized political, cultural, or religious be-
liefs. Van Alstyne's analysis is of little value in identifying consti-
tutionally infirm indoctrination and the method for handling the
problem of indoctrination, if it exists.
A person's perception of what constitutes indoctrination de-
pends on the values that are being inculcated and one's view of
those values. To paraphrase Professor Sidney Hook, our own first
principles are "truths" that should be central to the educational
scheme; the first principles of those with whom we disagree are
mere "prejudices" that should be discarded. 9 Simply stating that
disagreement exists over the values that should be inculcated, how-
ever, and determining whether a given scheme of indoctrination is
therefore "good" or "bad" provides little guidance for lawmaking
or constitutional interpretation. Such disagreement provides one
reason why it is unsatisfactory to declare that teachers, as opposed
to all other actors in the educational system, should have some
form of ultimate authority. Merely recognizing the controversy
does not provide a formula for determining the role of the Consti-
tution in the classroom.
Nevertheless, recognition that citizens frequently differ over val-
ues, and that their differences often may be irreconcilable at a nor-
mative level, furnishes a major clue to at least one overarching
point of societal consensus-allowing disagreement is an agreed
upon value. Indeed, the first amendment supports this notion, and
279. Hook, Introduction to S. HooK, P. KURTz & M. TODOROVICH, THE UNIVERsrY AND
THE STATE: WHAT ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION? 2-3 (1978).
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the bulk of first amendment decisions have recognized a core value
in dissent and individual expression. s0 One commentator has char-
acterized the entire democratic enterprise as a continuing dialectic
based upon the model of the academy.28l Within the context of the
public schools, Barnette and Tinker support a constitutionally
protected freedom to be different.28 2 The trial court in Cary283 also
protected the values of dissent and diversity.
If the freedom to be different is a value upon which a consensus
can be reached, then Professor Van Alstyne's argument and the
trial court's opinion in Cary should make one wary of a wholesale
approval of Professor Goldstein's analysis. Most people agree that
public schools should inculcate values. The difficulty lies in deter-
mining which values the schools should emphasize and what degree
of deference schools should accord to those values outside the
mainstream. Goldstein is correct in his criticism of Van Alstyne's
deference to the teacher as the principal decisionmaker; he under-
stands that the political climate in which school administrators op-
erate may make them more sensitive than teachers to community
values. The problem that Van Alstyne suggested and that worried
the court in Cary, however, remains unresolved. Majoritarian val-
ues, as defined by the school board, may not recognize the dignity,
worth, and "truth" of values espoused by a minority. If applied
with consistency and sophistication, the majoritarian values may
indoctrinate students with the idea that certain beliefs are inher-
ently incorrect 284 and may stifle- the interest in being different.
Thus, schools may fail to fulfill both functions: by inadequately
training students in the intellectual decisionmaking processes re-
quired of functioning adults in a democratic polity, they fail to
transmit knowledge; and by teaching students to become intoler-
280. See, e.g., National Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
281. See, T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-8 (1966).
282. The cases protecting a teacher in extracurricular expression manifest the same inter-
est. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 107-26.
284. The current debate over role models in school textbooks is a case in point. The reme-
dies proposed by some critics may be worse than the original problem. See Hodgson, Sex,
Texts, and the First Amendment, 5 J.L. & EDUc. 173 (1976).
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ant of minority viewpoints, they fail to inculcate the agreed-upon
values of dissent and free expression.
The Constitution does not require the state to remain silent, ex-
cept in religious matters.28 5 Although the Constitution may prevent
a state from silencing individual citizens, the state can sponsor pa-
triotic programs and try to engender feelings of loyalty. Citizens
are free to disagree or to abstain from participation, but no consti-
tutional basis exists for preventing state propaganda. Thus, so long
as those who dissent are not compelled to participate, school au-
thorities can sponsor a wide range of value inculcation programs.2 8 6
Of course, the teaching process itself inculcates values.
How, then, can the concerns of Professor Van Alstyne be ad-
dressed? Thai is, how can we ensure that permissible propaganda
does not become a form of indoctrination in an orthodoxy counter
to the values of free expression? The immediate answer, and the
one on which Professor Goldstein relies, is that the political pro-
cess should redress any imbalance.287 A political solution should
work because elected school officials and other supervisory person-
nel generally act in good faith. However, political systems in some
communities actually may accept an imbalanced, intolerant educa-
tional program.2 88 The cases discussed in Part II of this article sug-
gest that the vociferous complaints of a relatively few people may
skew the political process. School authorities may reflect accurately
the expressed community values, leaving few realistic alternatives
for the children of parents who do not conform to the local
wisdom.2 9
Two theoretical arguments exist for challenging a narrow, intol-
erant curriculum that reflects majoritarian values.2 9 0 The first, an
285. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
286. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
287. See Goldstein, supra note 21, at 1356. Diamond reached the same conclusion. Dia-
mond, supra note 267 at 528.
288. The pattern of school segregation in the South was an example of such a problem.
Segregation reinforced the inculcation of the belief in racial inequality.
289. Private schools are a theoretical alternative, and in some instances home education
may be appropriate. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). These alternatives
are unrealistic for most people, however, especially with the combined effect of rising tuition
for private schools and rising property taxes to support public schools.
290. I express my own bias by suggesting that a curriculum developed in response to the
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individualist approach, provides a remedy for a teacher who is
forced to teach half-truths. The second, an instrumentalist ap-
proach, uses a systemic analysis to develop more fully the public
utility argument discussed or implied in a variety of cases. 91 The
first argument views self-expression under the first amendment as
an end in itself. The second approach treats the first amendment
as a means to achieve an educated, enlightened citizenry that will
collectively nourish the democratic process and advance the search
for truth. Both arguments have substantial support in case law and
in scholarly commentaries, although the latter approach is more
prevalent in the case law. 2 Realistically, separating the interests
central to both lines of argument is often difficult.
Justice Stewart viewed Epperson as a free speech case.293 He be-
lieved that the Constitution protects a teacher who speaks in the
classroom on a particular subject, even if the subject is outside the
scope of the prescribed curriculum, so long as the subject is part of
a "system of respected human thought. ' 29 4 Stewart's opinion pro-
vides a basis for arguing that a teacher should not be punished for
classroom remarks that relate to human knowledge and culture.
His language suggests, and the case law generally confirms,295 that
the employer's ability to control the teacher's speech increases as
the teacher's speech moves from off the campus to on the campus
to within the classroom. 296 The critical question is whether Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Epperson, or first amendment law in gen-
eral, furnishes a basis for a teacher's assertion of a right to speak
what he believes is the truth, or to refuse to speak what he consid-
political process and in accordance with majoritarian views may be narrow and intolerant.
291. See supra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
292. See generally L. TAMIE, supra note 14, § 12-1, at 576-79.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
294. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 116 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
295. Compare, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (off campus) with
Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (within classroom).
296. Justice Stewart's language is consistent with the time, place, and manner decisions in
which the degree of state interest varies depending on when and where the activity occurs
and what it entails. See generally Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). Compare
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) with Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969).
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ers an untruth or half-truth.
The current debate over "scientific creationism" provides a good
example of the problems that might face a conscientious biology
teacher under the individualist approach. A biology teacher who
must discuss scientific creationism must disregard the scientific
method. He must teach, as truth, a concept based on religious doc-
trines. A state requirement to teach scientific creationism would
compel him to disseminate misleading information about provable
facts and strongly inferable conclusions.
Arguably, if a teacher's employment contract delineates the pre-
scribed curriculum, including scientific creationism, then the
teacher is estopped to complain later of a constitutional intrusion.
If the dispute were between private parties, the argument would be
compelling; the dispute would be subject to ordinary rules of con-
tract interpretation. But the government stands in a different pos-
ture. Public employment cannot be predicated on the surrender of
individual constitutional rights,97 except in limited circumstances
involving national security298 or the military.299 Thus, a contract
that requires the teaching of a particular subject must meet consti-
tutional standards, notwithstanding the interest in freedom of
contract.300
The privacy cases since Griswold v. Connecticut °1 have sug-
gested that the first amendment30 2 protects the concept of personal
automony. 03 Speech is one means by which an individual may ex-
press himself, but expression is not limited to speech. Expression
also may embrace the peculiarly individual aspects of a person's
297. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
298. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); United States v.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
299. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
300. If, for example, a teacher signed a contract that required daily prayers in the class-
room, the freedom of contract argument would not overcome the constitutional invalidity of
the contract.
301. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
302. Other amendments also may contribute to the constitutional protection of personal
autonomy. The Court in Griswold cited the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments to support its decision.
303. See L. TmBE, supra note 13, § 12-1, at 576-79. See also Greenawalt, Personal Pri-
vacy and the Law, WILSON Q., Spring 1978, at 67; Konvitz Privacy andf the Law: A Philo-
sophical Prelude, 31 LAw & ComEMP. PROBS. 272 (1966); Negley, Philosophical Views on
the Value of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (1966).
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lifestyle, including decisions about marriage, cohabitation,so
306 30 movistyles of dress,30s procreation,07 sexual relations,s18 and movie
viewing.5 09 Although the state may place reasonable limitations on
the exercise of these various activities, the state is usually power-
less to require an individual to perform any of them against his
will. The state can require children under a certain age to attend
school, but a child cannot be forced to speak, write, or read once
he is there. The state can withhold rewards, however, such as ad-
vancement to the next grade level or the conferral of a diploma.
People cannot be required to marry, although states may presume
a status of marriage after a man and a woman have lived together
openly for a period of time.310 Similarly, a couple cannot be forced
to have children, although the state may place limitations on the
distribution of contraceptives1 and the availability of abor-
tions." 2 A state may control pornography,313 but not within a citi-
zen's home; 14 the government cannot ban writings, movies, or
other forms of depiction unless the material meets delineated stan-
dards of obscenity and unless it is distributed publicly.31 5
304. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
305. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). But cf. Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
306. The state may enforce, consistently with the Constitution, certain standards of disci-
pline through dress-code requirements for police, Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), or
teachers, East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1977).
307. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
308. The state, however, may punish adultery. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library,
436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052
(1978). The state may prohibit homosexual relations as well. See Doe v. Commonwealth's
Att'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (en banc) (Virginia's sodomy law not unconstitu-
tional), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (mem.).
309. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), established an individual's right to read or
view virtually anything within his own home.
310. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DosmasTic RELATIONS 45-58 (1968) (discussing common law
marriage).
311. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
312. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
313. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
314. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
315. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973) (public distribution of pornography).
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The Supreme Court's strongest statements on coerced speech
came in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillol8 and Wooley v.
Maynard.3 17 In Tornillo, the Court invalidated a Florida right-to-
reply statute that had provided a mechanism for a public figure to
demand newspaper space for a response to unflattering editorials
or news stories. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated:
The clear implication [of prior cases] has been that any such
compulsion to publish that which "'reason' tells them should
not be published" is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an
undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not man-
dated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot
be legislated.318
In Wooley, the Court held that a New Hampshire citizen could not
be compelled to display the motto "Live Free or Die" on his li-
cense plates. The state was free to print the motto on the license
plates, but could not punish someone who chose to cover or erase
the motto. A contrary result would invade "the sphere of intellect
and spirit" of the individual." 9
These two cases, as well as Barnette, indicate a judicial resis-
tance to state-mandated expression contrary to the legitimately
held beliefs of an individual. As Professor Lawrence Tribe has in-
dicated,3 20 Barnette provided protection against coerced majoritar-
ianism by allowing the dissenter to refrain from participation in a
state-mandated activity. Tornillo and Wooley extended this prin-
ciple by forbidding the state to make a citizen an agent, even a
passive. one, for the propagation of ideas that the citizen
opposed.32 1
Similar arguments might be applied to classroom instruction. If
316. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
317. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
318. 418 U.S. at 256. See also Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133
(9th Cir. 1971); Chicago Joint Bd., Amalg. Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435
F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Carpets By the Carload, Inc. v.
Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
319. 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
320. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 15-5, at 901 n.15.
321. The Florida statute in Tornillo made newspapers the vehicles for the propagation of
individual views that the newspaper opposed.
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a teacher need not participate in patriotic ceremonies because of
validly held personal beliefs, he should not be forced to teach un-
founded theories, such as scientific creationism. 22 If the school
board members insist on instruction in the subject, they probably
can find someone who can teach it with a clear conscience. But
courts should not allow the school board to require a trained biolo-
gist, upon pain of losing his job, to act as a mouthpiece for the
dissemination of information that is scientifically unsound and
misleading. By the same token, a teacher who has a validly held
religious belief that evolution is wrong and that its teaching is sin-
ful should not be required to teach that subject. The curriculum
need not exclude evolution, creationism, 323 or planned parenthood.
A reasonable accommodation should be made for a teacher who
finds that teaching such subjects intrudes upon personal, religious,
moral, or scientific beliefs, and denies the teacher's personal
autonomy.32
One assumes that school authorities could not subject a teacher
to disciplinary action simply for mentioning ideas, theories, or
major figures not covered adequately in the textual materials; but
whether a teacher may assert a violation of his right of free speech
because he is told to teach a subject area without including major
substantive theories or figures is unclear. A policy dispute over the
use of a particular textbook does not implicate a teacher's personal
autonomy in the same manner as a requirement to teach quasi-
religious theories. But by focusing on a teacher's interest in auton-
omy, a court can test decisions of school authorities while avoiding
the sometimes flawed mechanisms of the political process.
In addition to the individual interests a teacher has in his pro-
fession, the community also has an interest in seeing that tax-sup-
ported institutions, such as the public schools, provide a balanced
322. The basis for excusing the teacher in this instance is respect for the teacher's auton-
omy. An instrumentalist argument against including creationism in the science curriculum
may exist because creationism does not prepare students to deal with science and the scien-
tific method.
323. Epperson may not permit the teaching of creationism if the method of instruction is
too closely bound up with Genesis.
324. Such an accommodation does not mean that the curriculum must be tailored to the
idiosyncracies of every teacher. See Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
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view of the world, train students adequately, and preserve social
values, including a respect for free expression. These notions sub-
sume much of the courts' opinions in Mailloux and in Cary. The
concepts also underlie Professor Van Alstyne's theory and are ap-
parent in Justice Stewart's concurrence in Epperson. The concepts
could provide a basis for arguing that a student or his taxpaying
parent should have standing to challenge the actions of a school
system that does not adequately pursue these goals. 25 Such a chal-
lenge might run afoul of decisions holding that education is not a
fundamental right,3 26 and that a person has no right to demand a
particular quality of curriculum.32 7
At first blush, the public utility analogy and the focus on the
community interest in encouraging teacher creativity or in
preventing doctrinal orthodoxy would appear to have little rele-
vance to the constitutional protection of free speech. The first
amendment serves generally as a restraint on governmental inter-
ference in matters of individual conscience, expression, and publi-
cation. The assertion that a teacher has a constitutional right to
teach as he likes is grounded in the notion that individual expres-
sion should be free of state regulation. On the other hand, the pub-
lic utility analogy posits a model based on interests defined by ref-
erence to the entire polity. Individual speech may be important in
the public utility model, but is subsumed within an overriding con-
cern for communal interests expressed through a state mechanism.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the public utility analogy does not
adequately take into account the individual interests of the partici-
pants in public education. If balanced presentations and equal
time for opposing views are required, it would be difficult to pro-
vide an individual teacher with the discretion necessary to main-
tain a modicum of autonomy with respect to curriculum content
and pedagogical method. The system, not the discrete individual
actors, would be the focus. Absent an administrative regulatory
325. See Van Alstyne, supra note 269, at 857. But cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
326. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). An equal pro-
tection argument may exist if an identifiable class is systematically excluded from participa-
tion in educational programs meeting minimal standards of quality. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982).
327. See Arundar v. DeKalb County School Dist., 620 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1980).
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scheme, judges would become the ultimate arbiters of most dis-
putes concerning curriculum and pedagogy.3 28
Nevertheless, a combination of individual and communal inter-
ests may provide a framework for a model that retains the public
utility analogy while focusing on the individual participants. If
teachers have a right not to speak, based on the notion of personal
autonomy and manifested through self-expression, then their audi-
ences have a reciprocal right to be free from false indoctrination.
Whether this theory could develop into a full-scale right to know,
thereby allowing students to demand a broad range of academic
services, is problematic and fraught with potentially disastrous
policy implications. The theory could develop, however, into a
right not to be impeded in the pursuit of free inquiry and into a
right not to hear. The crux of the matter involves two different
coercive forces-the taxing laws that provide revenues for public
education, and mandatory attendance laws. Because the state
forces people to pay for and attend school, a strong argument can
be made that the service should be free from coerced ideological
indoctrination because such coercion is contrary to the fundamen-
tal tenets of the first amendment.
3 29
The classroom is far from the paradigmatic marketplace of ideas.
Although a teacher is accorded some basic constitutional protec-
tion for work within the classroom, he does not have absolute dis-
cretion over curriculum content and pedagogical method. A con-
328. The closest analogy is FCC regulation of the electronic media. Rules requiring "fair-
ness" or "equal time" for political candidates are limitations on the rights of licensees that
are justified by the scarcity of the resource and the limited monopoly granted by the govern-
ment to broadcast licensees. One can make an analogous argument for free expression in
schools:
Free expression is therefore necessary for the creation of an atmosphere in
which the school boards can effectively carry out their collectivist functions of
academic achievement and socialization. The exchange of ideas and exposure
to diversity within the school curriculum prepare the student for life in a dem-
ocratic society that values a certain degree of heterogeneity. They are a prereq-
uisite to good citizenship, and it is in the state's interest to expose all children
to the experience.
Project, supra note 267, at 1441.
329. The presence of private schools is not an acceptable alternative to non-neutral state
education. Not enough private schools are available, and most are expensive. They also are
subject to at least some state accreditation standards, and students are subject to compul-
sory attendance laws.
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trary result would invite anarchy and subject students to the
doctrinaire pronouncements of a single teacher. To succeed, stu-
dents might be required to learn, espouse, and accept ideas con-
trary to their own values, or to adopt notions outside the main-
stream of American thought. This indoctrination would violate
their personal autonomy in the same way that requiring a teacher
to speak might interfere with the teacher's personal autonomy. Ad-
ditionally, the indoctrination would constitute a failure to transmit
accurately knowledge of how to operate in a free and open polity,
and a failure to inculcate important values upon which societal
consensus exists. Precisely the same could be said of attempts by
doctrinaire school boards to limit student awareness of various
ideas and subject matter. The Constitution does not require a bal-
anced presentation of all subjects. Instead, the argument simply
indicates that a state that compels attendance at school cannot
subject students to ideological propaganda that imposes conform-
ity, encourages intolerance, or presents a factually skewed view of
the world.330
If the student derives his right not to hear from the teacher's
right not to speak falsely, a question arises whether a student may
complain because the teacher willingly propounds ideological prop-
aganda mandated by the school board. Tying the student's right to
the teacher's right may circumscribe too narrowly the student's in-
terest. Although the Court in Virginia Pharmacy spoke of the
right to hear as the reciprocal of a speaker's right to speak, the
listener's right was independent of the speaker's. The consumers
had standing regardless of the pharmacists' desire to advertise.
Thus, the issue in Virginia Pharmacy was not whether anyone ac-
tually wanted to speak, but whether the form of communication
was subject to state control. The opposite also should hold true. If
330. One cannot realistically argue, as Justice Rehnquist did in Island Trees, that ideas
are not suppressed or orthodoxy not imposed if students are allowed to read and discuss
ideas outside the school. 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2832-33 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). His
criticisms of the plurality opinion in Island Trees are well-taken and, on the facts, his opin-
ion is not without merit. He tends to overlook, however, the overwhelming importance that
schools have in molding young minds. Schools are the most important and time-consuming
activity for most children between the ages of six and eighteen. The availability of ideas for
discussion outside the school is no doubt important, but what happens inside school un-
doubtedly will be substantially more important.
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the state requires the speech-related activity involved in teaching,
then the recipients, regardless of the speaker's interest in dissemi-
nation, have a right not to hear as well as a right to hear. Indeed,
because the presence of the listeners is coerced and the opportuni-
ties for rebuttal are limited, sensitivity to the students' interests
should be particularly heightened.
The first amendment should and does have some role in the op-
eration of our schools. Identifying and vindicating first amendment
interests on a daily basis is another matter. Judges consistently
have expressed a desire for the maintenance of local control of
schools with minimal judicial interference, 31 although some judges
are not deterred from engaging in close scrutiny of educational de-
cisions.33 2 On the whole, judicial non-interference is desirable. The
Constitution does not demand educational conformity. Indeed, the
essence of the argument in support of a first amendment presence
in the schools is that diversity, dissent, pluralism, and individual-
ity are important. Judicial interference, however, could lead to a
nationally homogeneous educational system that would lack spirit
and creativity. The curriculum best suited to a farming community
may be quite different from the one best suited to an urban school
system. Differences in curriculum should be encouraged, but they
will not flourish if judicial activism results in the constitutionaliza-
tion of every curricular and pedagogical dispute.
Moreover, litigation in an adversarial setting tends to weaken
the collegial bonds within institutions. One who has legitimate
cause for complaint should be free to seek judicial redress, but fre-
quent judicial intervention alters intra-institutional relationships.
Admittedly, school teachers and their administrative superiors are
not always close associates, but treating often trivial disputes as
constitutional issues of national importance can create an institu-
tional framework of adversarial relationships that poisons the edu-
cational atmosphere. Thus, for most issues, Professor Goldstein's
approach of deferral to local political mechanisms for the vindica-
tion of individual and group interests is sound. But a proper con-
331. See, e.g., East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. 562 F.2d 838, 857 (2d Cir.
1977).
332. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316
F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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cern for specific individual interests and an avoidance of ideologi-
cal indoctrination must exist as alternative bases for challenging
educational policies.
The procedures used in reaching decisions that may affect con-
stitutional interests are important to ensure a proper balance. A
few cases holding against school managers have involved precipi-
tate action.3 33 Fining or suspending a teacher is a harsh remedy
that may affect a judge who wants to ensure fairness. Similarly, if
books are suddenly withdrawn from a library or a reading list,
those affected may feel aggrieved. Yet some risk always exists that
a teacher will raise a constitutional smokescreen to mask incompe-
tence or unprofessional conduct. As the Supreme Court noted in a
recent decision:
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employ-
ment question resolved against him because of constitutionally
protected conduct. But that same candidate ought not to be
able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from
assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to
rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the protected
conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of
its decision.3 4
The earlier discussion of Island Trees suggested that the opin-
ions of Justices Brennan and Blackmun, read together, imply a
procedural due process right as much as a substantive right.3 5 Al-
though Justice Brennan's opinion emphasized a newly defined
right to receive information, a narrower process-oriented reading
comports with both precedent and practical application. Such an
interpretation would furnish a process that allows the free expres-
sion of disagreements about a proposed policy.
Policies affecting the acquisition, use, dissemination, or removal
of classroom and library materials implicate the first amendment
because the policies affect teachers' abilities to teach, students' op-
portunities to learn, and the overall quality of the educational ex-
333. See, e.g., Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); cf. Parker v. Board
of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.) (holding in favor of school board), afl'd per curiam, 348
F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
334. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 212-19.
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perience. These policies also have a pedagogical impact because
they express a community view about what is important and what
is not. The imposition of some discretionary limitations on school
managers, therefore, is reasonable. Requiring school authorities to
ensure minimal procedural safeguards, to allow fair notice of poli-
cies and policy changes, and to grant those affected an opportunity
to be heard would not interfere'unreasonably with the discharge of
managerial obligations. A due process requirement would also pro-
vide a framework for institutional consideration of constitutional
interests without externalizing conflicts among students, teachers,
and school authorities. Courts already recognize that students and
teachers have due process rights in disciplinary proceedings.
Teachers and students may rely on the first amendment in certain
circumstances. Consistency demands that procedural safeguards
protect first amendment interests in contexts other than discipli-
nary proceedings.
Professor David Diamond has argued that:
Tinker's conception of the relationships between the first
amendment and the public schools, between teachers and stu-
dents and the Constitution, and between the courts and the lo-
cal school administration, was fundamentally incorrect. Con-
trary to the Tinker Court's conclusion ... courts should apply
only a limited standard of review to local school administration
action: the minimum rationality standard currently used to re-
view government activity that does not implicate fundamentaf
rights.3 36
Diamond's essay notes the danger of widespread judicial inter-
ference in school systems, but his argument fails to recognize that
school board actions do occasionally implicate first amendment
rights. Both teachers and students have these rights as citizens; the
Supreme Court has held consistently that these rights are not lost
by virtue of the status of a teacher as a teacher or a student as a
student.3 7 One can question whether wearing black armbands, as
336. Diamond, supra note 267, at 477.
337. Even the Island Trees dissenters agreed "with the fundamental proposition that
'students do not "shed their rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.."" 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting the Court, id. at 2807, quot-
ing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
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in Tinker, is a form of expression that should be permitted in
schools without questioning the fundamental notion that a student
retains free speech rights when he enters the school. The same is
true for a teacher or any other public employee. Thus, a minimum
rationality standard does not afford enough protection when a
complaint asserts a denial of a free speech right.
Excessive judicial interference, however, can be avoided if the
court focuses initially on the process afforded to those affected by
a particular decision. Coupled with a recognition of the values of
diversity and of community control through the local political sys-
tem, a process-oriented approach protects individual rights, recog-
nizes majoritarian interests, and minimizes judicial involvement.
This bridges the gap between the approaches of Professors Van
Alstyne and Goldstein. Substantive judicial review still would be
available for egregious cases and for the protection of individualist
concerns of conscience against majoritarian sentiments, as in Bar-
nette. Someone must ultimately determine "educational suitabil-
ity." Group decisions reached after full debate may not always be
just, but if the process allows for debate, and if the courts stand
ready to rectify the worst cases, the result is a balanced policy that
avoids the extremes of leaving such decisions wholly to the vagar-
ies of community politics or wholly to the whims of federal judges.
Governmental processes are rarely neutral. If questions of curric-
ulum content and textbook selection are decided solely through the
political process, except in situations of obvious abuse of a consti-
tutional right 38 or when the government exceeds its authority,33'
the balance shifts toward majoritarianism and away from individ-
ual liberty. If, on the other hand, the Constitution has a more di-
rect role in deciding such questions, then the schools must become
more sensitive to individual rights. In a slightly different context
Charles Frankel wrote:
The law may cease taking the sides it does with regard to partic-
ular issues, but it cannot cease taking some side. To ease the
abortion laws may seem morally neutral because it does not re-
quire any individual with conscientious scruples against abortion
338. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
339. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
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to receive an abortion. But it changes the effective scale of val-
ues in society. It gives new powers to one set of moral norms and
reduces the power and influence of the other. Each time that a
court takes action, even in the name of the individual's right to
be different, it legislates not simply for liberty but for a new
balance among moral norms. Liberty is always limited by con-
siderations, spoken or unspoken, of what is morally legitimate.
When actions are permitted that have previously been prohib-
ited, the circle of legitimacy changes.340
The balancing process need not be such that individual liberty ex-
cludes all other values. Rather, it is consistent with the goals of
transmitting knowledge, inculcating democratic values and devel-
oping intellectual abilities for schools to implement the values in-
herent in the first amendment. This does not mean that discipline,
pedagogical control, and community values should take a secon-
dary position, but only that the protection of free speech interests
should not be left solely to the political process.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a wide range of cases dealing with va-
rious issues in elementary and secondary education, and has at-
tempted to identify and articulate some unifying constitutional
themes. The proper and efficient functioning of our public school
systems is important to all of us and to the continued strength of
American democracy. The schools must train succeeding genera-
tions in the central values of democracy. Public schools also must
recognize and encourage the values of diversity and pluralism.
These institutions are proper subjects of constitutional concern,
and it is appropriate to examine school operations to ensure that
they preserve a proper regard for individual interests and for free
expression. We should avoid, however, an unremittingly nationalist
approach to constitutional adjudication that involves the federal
judiciary in essentially local, and often inconsequential, disputes.
Education will not improve and the Constitution will not be vindi-
cated by the wholesale application of constitutional protections to
individual teachers or students, or by the wholesale rejection of
340. Frankel, supra note 56, at 621.
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constitutional principles in favor of reliance on the local political
process.
